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INTRODUCTION 
Eight years on from the introduction of the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic 
Trade Agreement (the "CER Agreement"), the goal of business law harmonisation 
remains plagued with a number of unresolved issues, of which trade practice 
regulation is only one. In that area, 1 July 1990 saw a major step towards harmonisation 
with the introduction of legislation on both sides of the Tasman giving trans-Tasman 
effect to the market power prohibitions contained in the New Zealand Commerce Act 
1986 and the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974.1 The amendments widened the 
geographic definitions of "market" for the purpose of defining the locations of 
dominance, or in Australia's case, a substantial degree of market power, to include both 
New Zealand and Australia, effectively extending the jurisdiction of each Act. After 
looking at the background to, and terms of, this significant amendment, this paper 
discusses the concept of a single trans- Tasman market, the main differences between 
the new provisions in each country, and some of the implications of those differences. 
In the writer's view, the different market power threshold applying in each country 
may lead to some undesirable results in terms of the objectives embodied in the CER 
Agreement. 
The new trans-Tasman market power provisions do not extend to conduct affecting 
competition in a market for services. This leaves a large gap in the sections' coverage 
when viewed in light of the significance of the service sectors to both economies. This 
paper proceeds to examine the Protocol on Trade in Services (signed as part of the 1988 
review of the CER Agreement), and the consequences of significant service industries 
in both Australia and New Zealand being excluded from the trade liberalisation ideals 
embodied in that Protocol. The writer considers that the real benefits of that Protocol 
will only be seen when the governments of both countries are prepared to fully expose 
their service industries to competition from other Australasian firms. 
The paper then looks at the restrictive trade practice regimes which are in place on 
either side of the Tasman and considers the significance of some differences between 
the two. The possibility of giving trans-Tasman effect to further restrictive trade 
practice provisions in both Acts is addressed and the case for consistency between the 
two regimes is advanced. 
The paper then outlines the merger regimes presently operating in each country and 
canvasses a number of issues arising out of some differences that exist between the two 
regimes. The possibility of establishing a joint forum to rule on mergers with 
trans-Tasman effect is raised and the probable difficulties with such a proposal noted. 
Finally, the writer offers a summary and some concluding comments on the material 
covered. 
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BACKGROUND TO CER 
The concept of closer economic relations between New Zealand and Australia 
developed against the background of a longstanding political and economic 
relationship between the two countries. Under the 1965 New Zealand Australia Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), trade between the two countries developed, at least 
initially, with the removal of a number of tariff barriers previously hindering free 
trans-Tasman trade. Unfortunately the NAFTA articles did not contain mechanisms for 
the progressive elimination of trade barriers that had been exempted from the initial 
agreement. It related only to a limited number of products which the two governments 
considered easy to liberalise. By the end of the 1970's it was clear that the benefits of 
NAFTA were seriously circumscribed by the large number of products that lay outside 
its scope. 
As a result, the governments of both countries began negotiating a more 
comprehensive .trading treaty to overcome NAFTA's shortcomings. Heads of 
Agreement were signed by both governments in December 1982 followed by the 
signing of the CER Agreement on 24 March 1984 (although the Agreement was deemed 
to have come into force on 1 January 1983). As had been the case with NAFTA, the 
CER Agreement related principally to trade in goods between the two countries. It 
provided a framework for the progressive removal of tariff and quantitative restrictions 
on trans-Tasman trade and is the most comprehensive bilateral trade agreement 
entered into by either country. 
The stated principal objectives of the CER Agreement are:2 
"(a) to strengthen the broader relationship between Australia and New Zealand; 
(b) to develop closer economic relations between the Member States through a 
mutually beneficial expansion of free trade between New Zealand and Australia; 
(c) to eliminate barriers to trade between Australia and New Zealand in a gradual 
and progressive nianner under an agreed timetable and with a minimum of 
disruption; and 
(d) to develop trade between New Zealand and Australia under conditions of fair 
competition." 
In pursuance of these principal objectives the CER Agreement contains the following 
additional objectives: 
"(i) the progressive reduction of tariffs in both countries on all foods originating in 
their 
3
respective territories with a view to tire elimination of al tariffs by the end of 
1987, 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
(vi) 
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the progressive liberalisation aid elimination of quantitative import restrictions 
and tariff quotas on such goods; 
the elimination of revenue duties that discriminate against goods originating in 
and imported from the territory of a Mem~r State in comparison witn the duties 
or taxes charged on similar domestic goods; 
the reduction agd elimination of quantitative export restrictions on trade between 
both countries; 
a "working towards' the elimination of all export sub7idies and export incentives on goods traded in the Area covered by the Agreement; and 
an active "working towards" the elinynation of preferential treatment for domestic 
suppliers on government purchasing. 11 
More specifically, Article 12(1) of the CER Agreement addressed the concern that 
differences in legal requirements in the two countries could distort trade, by placing 
obligations on Member States to: 
"(a) examine the scope for taking action to harmonise requirements relating to such 
matters as standards, technical specifications and testing procedures, domestic 
labelling and restrictive trade practices; and 
(b) where appropriate, encourage government bodies and other organisations and 
institutions to work towards the harmonisation of such requirements. 11 
Trade Practice laws at the Time 
At the time the CER Agreement was signed, New Zealand and Australia were 
following quite different paths in the regulation of competitive behaviour within their 
respective jurisdictions. Australia's Trade Practices Act 1974 and its 1977 amendments 
were enacted with the aim, inter alia, of promoting competitive behaviour and 
prohibiting certain anti-competitive practices. To this end it established the Australian 
Trade Practices Commission and provided both the Commission and private 
individuals, with recourse to the Federal Court system for a range of relief in respect of 
restrictive trade practices and other monopolistic behaviour. 
Across the Tasman, the Commerce Act 1975 fell far short of its Australian counterpart 
in terms of promoting competition. Its aims included the protection of the interests of 
consumers and the development of New Zealand industry and commerce in line with 
economic policies of government. The Act was concerned with the public interest goals 
of resource utilisation, industrial and commercial development and efficiency, 
employment opportunities, and export trade, as well as competition. The Act 
conferred no private law remedies and was viewed by many as administratively 
cumbersome. 
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In 1986, New Zealand adopted a radically different direction in the regulation of 
restrictive trade practices, mergers and takeovers and other related issues. New 
Zealand's Commerce Act 1986 (the "Commerce Act") (and the Fair Trading Act 1986) 
was modelled on the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 (the "Trade Practices Act").9 
Although a number of differences exist between the Acts they now share a common 
object of promoting competition and contain a number of broadly similar tests and 
procedures. 
11,e 1988 Review of the CER Agreement 
The CER Agreement made provision for a review of its operation in 1988.10 By the 
time that review took place, New Zealand import licensing and Australia quota 
requirements had been substantially removed in relation to trans-Tasman trade and the 
tariffs on most items traded between the two countries had been abolished. Between 
1983 and 1987, trans-Tasman trade doubled. As a result, the three goals set for the 1988 
review were: 11 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
to bring forward the removal of all tariffs and quantitative restrictions on goods 
from 30 June 1995 to the early 1990s; 
to examine the Australian and New Zealand business environments to identify 
those laws, regulations or other government interventions that constitute 
impediments to free trade, and examine ways of removing such impediments 
through harmonising approaches in tl~se areas; and 
to consider extending the scope of the CER Agreement to cover trade in services. 
The 1988 review resulted in three protocols being signed and seven understandings 
being reached, extending the scope of the CER Agreement to a much more 
encompassing doucument than simply a trade agreement. Those additional 
agreements may be summarised as follows: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
a protocol for the achievement of free trade in goods, without exception, by 1 July 
1990, witl1 anti- dumping procedures against goods originating m the free trade 
area being abolished from that date (and anti-dumping measures in effect or 
contemplated to be discontinued). Competition laws are to apply to 
anti-competitive conduct affecting trans-Tasman trade. The application of 
competition law is to be "in a manner consistent with the principles and objectives 
of the [CER] Agreement"; 
a protocol extending the agreement to trade in services which binds the two 
countries to free trade in most services markets and to examination of free trade in 
markets where restrictions remain; 
a protocol on harmonisation of quarantine procedures; 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
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exchanges of letters of customs harmonisation, trade in dairy products and export 
prohibitions; 
agreements and statements on industry assistance policies, government 
purchasing policies and trans-Tasman shipping; and 
a memorandum of understanding on harmonisation of business laws, "including 
in particular reli.ance on competition law to redress predatory trade between both 
countries". 
It is clear, in theory at least, that the revised boundaries of the CER Agreement are wide 
and provide not only free trade across the Tasman but also lay the framework for a full 
integration of business activities of the two countries if that course is desired. 
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THE NEW LEGISLATION 
New Zealand: Section 36A 
As a result of the 1988 review and, in particular, the agreement that competition laws 
should apply to anti- competitive conduct affecting trans-Tasman trade, in 1989 New 
Zealand introduced into Parliament the Commerce Law Reform Bill. The provisions of 
that Bill, inter alia, extended the reach of the market dominance provisions in section 36 
of the Commerce Act, to the use of a dominant position in any market within 
Australasia (with effect from 1 July 1990). The new provisions, introduced by the 
Commerce Amendment Act 1990 (into which the relevant clauses were enacted), 
provide as follows: 
"SECITON 36A USE OF DOMINANT POSITION IN TRANS-TASMAN MARKETS 
36A(1) No person wlw has -
(a) A dominant position in a market; or 
(b) A dominant position in a market in Australia; or 
(c) A dominant position in a market in New Zealand and Australia -
shall use that person's dominant position for the purpose of -
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
Restricting the entry of any person into any market, not being a market 
exclusively for services; or 
Preventing or deterring any person from engaging in competitive conduct 
in any market, not being a market exclusively for services; or 
Eliminating any person from any market, not being a market exclusively 
for services. 
The following definitions relating to the term "market" were also inserted into the 
Commerce Act by the 1990 Amendment Act 
3(1A) Every reference in this Act, except the reference in section 36A(l)(b) and (c) of this 
Act, to the term "market" is a reference to a market in New Zealand for goods or services 
as well as other goods or services that, as a matter of fact and commercial common sense, 
a re substitutable for them. 
3(1B) The reference in section 36A(1)(b) of this Act to the term "market", in relation to a 
market in Australia, is a reference to a market in Australia for goods or services as well as 
other goods or services tftat, as a matter of fact and commercial common sense, are 
substitutable for them. 
3(1C) The reference in section 36A(1)(c) of this Ad to the term "market" in relation to a 
market in New Zealand and Australia, is a reference to a market in New Zealand and 
Australia for soods or services as well as other goods or services that, as a matter of fact 
and commercial common sense, are substitutable for them. 
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As a necessary corollary, a new section 4(2) of the Act extends section 36A "to the 
engaging in conduct outside New Zealand by any person resident or carrying on 
business in Australia to the extent that such conduct affects a market, not being a 
market exclusively for services, in New Zealand." Section 4(2) was necessary as, prior 
to 1 July 1990, the jurisdiction of the Commerce Act was based on the normal rules of 
territorial application and was extended by section 4 to only a limited range of conduct 
outside New Zealand.12 Prior to the change, no action could be taken against an 
Australian company which was otherwise party to a contravention of section 36, but 
not resident or carrying on business in New Zealand. 
In addition, the Commerce Act provides for the Commerce and Trade Practices 
Commissions to use their information gathering powers in the other country.13 The 
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill (introduced shortly after the Commerce 
Law Reform Bill) made amendments to the Judicature Act 1908, the Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Judgments Act 1934 and the Evidence Act 1908. These amendments 
gave practical and procedural support for the extensions of scope and jurisdiction of 
New Zealand competition into Australia. 
Further legislative support for this new trans-Tasman jurisdiction is found in the new 
section 6A of the Commerce Act which provides that section 36A (together with 
provisions relating to enforcement, remedies, appeals and some miscellaneous 
provisions) applies to the Crown in right of the Commonwealth of Australia and each 
of the States and Territories, and every body corporate established for the purposes 
thereof or under the law of a State, or in which a State has controlling interest, in so far 
as the Crown or that corporation engages in trade. Section 6B of the Act also states that 
neither the Crown nor a body corporate that is an instrument of the Crown is immune 
from the jurisdiction of the courts of New Zealand and Australia in relation to a 
contravention of section 46A of the Australian Act or the provisions of that Act relating 
to contravention. 
Australia: Section 46A 
At the same time as trans-Tasman market provisions were introduced into the 
Commerce Act, similar provisions were introduced into Australia's Trade Practices Act 
1974 by the Trade Practices (Misuse of Trans-Tasman Market Power Act 1990. Section 
46A(2) of the Trade Practices Act now provides: 
-8-
"46A Misuse of market power - corporation with substantial degree of power in 
trans-Tasman market 
46A(l) In this section: 
"conduct", in relation to a market, means conduct in the market either as a 
supplier or acquirer of goods or services in the market; 
"im~act market" means a market in Australia that is not a market exclusively for 
services; 
"market power", in relation to a market, means market power in the market either 
as a supplier or acquirer of goods or services in the market; 
"trans-Tasman market" means a market in Australia, New Zealand or Australia 
and New Zealand for goods or services. 
(2) A corporation that has a substanti.al degree of market power in a trans-Tasman 
market must not take advantage of that power for the purpose of: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
eliminating or substanti.ally damaging a competitor of the corporation, or 
of a body corporate that is related to the corporation, m an impact market; 
or 
preventing the entry of a person into an impact market or; 
deterring or preventing a person from engaging in competitive conduct in 
an impact market." 
Provisions also exist, similar to those in the Commerce Act, extending the Trade 
Practices Act's extraterritorial operation14; extending the information gathering 
powers of the Commerce and Trade Practice Commissions15; expressly providing for 
the application of the Act to the New Zealand Crown and Crown corporations16; and 
stating that the Commonwealth, the States and the Territories are not immune from 
jurisdiction of the Courts of Australia and New Zealand in relation to matters arising 
under section 36A and the powers of the Commerce Commission in relation thereto.17 
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A SINGLE TRANS-TASMAN MARKET 
The concept of a "single trans-Tasman market" is rather different from the statutory 
concept of "market" which is customarily considered to be made up of elements of 
geography, product and functional level, within which there are a number of actual or 
potential transactions between buyers and sellers all of whom are sensitive to changes 
in price or supply. The single trans-Tasman market notion will not, other than in the 
most limited of cases, involve a market that stretches from the west coast of Australia to 
the east coast of New Zealand. While the market power required for a breach of section 
36A or 46A may be soured in any market within Australasia, it is not of course 
necessary that the market in any case be that large. The legislation expressly provides 
that the source of market power may be found in either a New Zealand market, an 
Australian market or a market in both New Zealand and Australia.18 In other words, 
the object of sections 36A and 46A is to widen the possible geographic boundaries of a 
market, for the purposes of identifying market power affecting a New Zealand or 
Australian market as the case may be (other than a market exclusively for services). 
As with the domestic market power provisions in section 36 of the Commerce Act and 
section 46 of the Trade Practices Act, it is not necessary that an offending party act in a 
proscribed way in relation to the same market as that in which the offender's market 
power is held. There may be exercises of market power in a market in one geographic 
area which impact on competitive conduct in a different market in a different 
geographic area. This is precisely what the new trans-Tasman provisions anticipate. 
The target market (that is, the market in which the alleged proscribed conduct is 
occurring) may be in either country and this will determine whether the breach is one 
of the New Zealand or Australian section. 
Sections 36A and 46A will provide redress for firms in both countries in a number of 
different scenarios including those outlined below: 
• 
• 
A firm resident in Australia seeking to carry on business in New Zealand may 
consider that a firm with a dominant position in a market in New Zealand is 
using that position for the purposes of restricting the Australian firm's entry into 
a New Zealand market. The "target" market is a New Zealand one and 
accordingly the Australian resident may have a cause of action under section 36A 
of the Commerce Act. 
Similarly, a New Zealand firm attempting to enter or engage in competitive 
conduct in a market in Australia would have a cause of action under the Trade 
Practices Act if a firm with a substantial degree of power in a market in Australia 
took advantage of that position for the purpose of eliminating or preventing the 
entry of the New Zealand firm into the Australian market. 
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• A New Zealand firm with a substantial degree of market power in any market 
within Australasia will be exposed under the Trade Practices Act in respect of its 
exporting behaviour in relation to Australian produced goods. Similar exposure 
under the Commerce Act threatens any Australian company with a dominant 
position in any market, which engages in conduct proscribed by section 36A(l) in 
the course of exporting goods to New Zealand. 
In other words (as Kerrin Vautier has noted19), section 36A of the Commerce Act is an 
avenue for redress not only for a firm in New Zealand which alleges contravention by a 
firm with a dominant position in any market within Australasia, but also for a firm in 
Australia which alleges contravention by a firm with a dominant position in any 
market within Australasia, in relation to a New Zealand market (other than one for 
services only20). 
Similarly, section 46A of the Australian Act is an avenue for redress not only for a firm 
in Australia which alleges contravention by a firm with a substantial degree of market 
power in any market within Australasia, but also for a firm in New Zealand which 
alleges contravention by a firm with a substantial degree of market power in any 
market within Australasia, again in relation to any market in Australia that is not one 
exclusively for services. 
At first glance the references in sections 36A(l)(a) of the Commerce Act and 46A of the 
Trade Practices Act to, respectively, a New Zealand market and a market in Australia, 
appear superfluous21 . It would seem that section 36 or 46 of the appropriate Act 
would already have caught the proscribed exercise of domestic market power by a 
person in a dominant posiotion in a New Zealand market or a person with a substantial 
degree of power in a market in Australia (as the case may be). 
One case which may not be caught by section 36 of the Commerce Act is one where an 
Australian company is neither resident nor carrying on business in New Zealand, but is 
alleged to have used a dominant position in a New Zealand market for a proscribed 
purpose. It seems possible, at least in theory, that a dominant position in a New 
Zealand market could exist without residency or the carrying on of business within 
New Zealand. Section 3(8) of the Commerce Act deems dominance of interconnected 
bodies corporate of a person to be dominance of that person.22 For example, an 
Australian firm may have subsidiaries operating in New Zealand any one of which is, 
or collectively are, dominant in a New Zealand market. Accordingly the Australian 
firm would be deemed to be dominant. Note also that section 3(8) defines a dominant 
position in a market as one in which a person "is in a position to exercise a dominant 
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influence .... ". This suggests that dominance may exist, for the purposes of sections 36 
and 36A, where the potential for that exists rather than actual, established dominance. 
One could expect that for a person to be caught by being "in a position" to exercise a 
dominant influence, it would need to be shown that a dominant influence could be 
exercised without undue time delay or capital expenditure. Under this scenario, as the 
Australian parent firm is not itself resident or carrying on business in this country it 
would probably not be caught by section 36(1) yet it may be caught by section 36A(1). 
Sections 36A and 46A give recognition to the fact that New Zealand and Australian 
firms may be hampered in their competitive efforts, not only by firms in their own 
country, but by firms across the Tasman. This becomes increasingly possible as export 
restrictions and subsidies are phased out and import restrictions and tariff quotas 
eliminated. The notion of the "trans-Tasman market" in competition terms, effectively 
extends the net of potential "wrong doers" who may be subject to either country's 
market power prohibitions. This must surely result in more confident competitive 
behaviour by Australian and New Zealand firms both in their own country and in each 
other's. 
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THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE MARKET POWER PROHIBITIONS IN NEW 
ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA 
It will be clear from the discussion so far that the New Zealand and Australian market 
power prohibitions in section 36A and 46A are not identical in their terms. The most 
obvious differences between them are the following: 
• the proscribed conduct under the New Zealand section includes "restricting the 
entry" of any person into a market, and "eliminating any person" from a 
market23. By contrast, the relevant Australian terms are "preventing the entry" 
of a person into a market and "eliminating or substantially damaging a 
competitor" in a market24; 
• section 36A prohibits the "use" of the relevant level of market power while section 
46A provides a corporation shall not "take advantage" of its market power; and 
• section 36A requires that a "dominant position in a market" be established 
whereas section 46A refers to a "substantial degree of market power". 
The obligation on New Zealand and Australia to examine the scope for harmonisation 
of their tests for restrictive trade practices, raises the question of the relevance of these 
differences and the neccessity for further amendment. 
Restricting vs Preventing Entry 
On its face New Zealand's use of the term "restricting entry" seems less absolute than 
Australia's more absolute reference to "preventing entry". Possibly an alleged 
wrongdoer may have the purpose of restricting but not preventing entry. Suppose a 
firm operates throughout New Zealand in a particular market, with the exception of a 
number of (perhaps uneconomic) geographic sub-markets. It is conceivable that the 
firm may act to restrict entry of a third party into its geographic trading areas (or at 
least its most profitable geographic markets) but not prevent entry absolutely. In 
practice however, the difference in purpose is probably one of little practical 
significance. In the example referred to, if the anti-competitive firm was not considered 
to be acting to prevent entry (which arguably it would be, albeit only in that part of the 
market in which it conducted business) it would clearly be caught by paragraph (e) in 
section 36A(1) which prohibits "preventing or deterring any person from engaging in 
competitive conduct". For this reason the writer is of the view the significance of the 
legislative difference will in practice be minimal and does not warrant priority in any 
forthcoming review of the section. 
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Eliminating Any Person vs Eliminating or Substantially Damaging a Competitor 
The Australian threshold purpose appears lower than New Zealand's in this area in 
that the less serious purpose of "substantially damaging" is caught by the section in 
addition to the purpose of "eliminating". The term "substantially" has been discussed 
in a number of cases in both Australia and New Zealand in different contexts and its 
imprecision recognised25. It has been interpreted in Australia for the purposes of 
section 46 as requiring loss or damage that is more than trivial or minimal. As in 
section 27 of the Commerce Act, the term imports a notion of relativity. In the 
appropriate context it may mean "real or of substance". It can also mean "large, 
weighty or big". In any event it will of course be necessary to know something of the 
nature of the business concerned before any decision can be made as to whether 
damage is, in any case, substantial. 
Regardless of the exact interpretation of the term, what is clear is that substantial 
damage may well fall far short of actual elimination (or rather the purpose of such). On 
that basis, the effect of the Australian provision will be (in theory at least) to catch a 
wider range of conduct than is possible under the New Zealand provision. It will 
however frequently be possible to rely on the widely drawn paragraph (e), already 
referred to, on the basis the anti-competitive purpose will generally include a purpose 
of preventing or deterring a person from engaging in competitive conduct. Again, the 
writer is of the view the difference between the provisions is more apparent than real. 
Use vs Take Advantage Of 
The New Zealand legislation refers to the "use" of requisite market power whereas the 
Australian Act prohibits a firm from "taking advantage" of specified levels of market 
power. While on its face the Australian term suggest some moral wrongdoing is 
required to establish breach, it is now clear following the High Court of Australia's 
decision in Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v The Broken Hill Proprietocy Co. Ltd26 
that the words "take advantage of' do not require an additional immoral, hostile or 
predatory intent be shown. In that case Mason CJ and Wilson J described the words as 
"morally indifferent" and equated them with the more neutral term "use".27 The 
Court was of the view that a use of market power occurs when the conduct at issue is 
possible or profitable only because the firm had that market power or if the conduct is 
such that it would not be undertaken if the market were truly competitive.28 This 
interpretation has been subsequently accepted by the Australian Trade Practices 
Commission. 29 and by the Federal Court of Australia in the recent decision Pont Data 
Australia Pty Ltd v ASX Operations Pty Ltd.30 
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In this country Tipping J in New Zealand Magic Millions Ltd v Wrightson Bloodstock 
LJ:d.31 examined the term "use" in the context of an application for an injunction to 
restrain Wrightson Bloodstock holding its annual auction of thorough-bred yearlings 
near Auckland, on dates which clashed with those of the plaintiff's (a new entrant) at 
Wellington. His Honour appeared not to find the question of whether a dominant 
position had been used, significant. He was prepared to find "use" established if one of 
the anti- competitive purposes in section 36(1) was established. He considered that 
where a dominant person acts with a prohibited purpose "it is almost axiomatic that 
such person had used [his or her] dominant position for a prohibited purpose".32 The 
key question was seen as not so much whether a dominant party has used its dominant 
position but rather whether or not its conduct is proved to have been for one or more of 
the proscribed purposes. If someone with a dominant position takes some action for a 
proscribed purpose, Tipping J considered that person would clearly be using that 
dominant position in a manner which section 36 prohibits. 
More recently in Union Shipping New Zealand Ltd v Port Nelson Ltd33 the New Zealand 
High Court specifically addressed the issue, noting there must be a "use" of a dominant 
position for infringement. The Court emphasised that the section does not state that a 
person who has a dominant position in a market may not "act" for proscribed 
purposes. The Court accepted that where "a person acts in a normal competitive 
fashion, as [he or she] would whether dominant or not, that person can hardly be said 
to be "using dominance"".34 Thus the Court related the question of whether the 
person acted in a normal competitive manner to the element of "use" rather than 
"purpose", suggesting that that fact should be used to identify "use". This approach 
seems more in line with the comments made by the High Court of Australia in the 
Queensland Wire case. 
While the approaches that have emerged in relation to drawing a link between levels of 
market power and examples of proscribed conduct have not been identical, it seems 
clear that in both New Zealand and Australia the test for making that link is one of 
"use" and that following Union Shipping and Queensland Wire this will involve an 
investigation of whether the conduct complained of would have occurred but for the 
market power of the incumbent in the market. In the writer's view, the difference in 
drafting between the two countries is probably of little if any practical significance. 
Levels of Market Power 
The most significant difference between the two trans-Tasman market power 
prohibitions is the level of market power required to be held by a firm before its 
conduct will fall foul of either section. 
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New Zealand 
Section 36A of the Commerce Act applies to any person who or which has a "dominant 
position" in a market. There has been little judicial comment on the different market 
power thresholds in Australia and New Zealand, however Davison CJ in Llsm 
Corporation Ltd v Commerce Commission35 stated that the test for dominance carries a 
higher threshold than the "substantially lessening competition test" in section 27 of the 
Commerce Act. This is generally accepted as being the case. 
The dominance threshold is relevant under the Commerce Act in provisions relating to 
both misuses of market power and business acquisitions and authority as to the 
meaning of the term "dominance" under one has been discussed and applied under the 
other. While an in-depth analysis of the term "dominance" is outside the scope of this 
paper, what can be said is that a finding of market dominance under the Commerce Act 
does not require complete independence of action. Rather, a level of market power 
enabling a party to act, to an appreciable extent, without regard to its competitors and 
without itself suffering losses (or at least losses that cannot be recovered in the long 
term) will be a highly relevant factor in establishing dominance. Also relevant will be 
factors such as market share, barriers to entry and constraints from other competitors 
and suppliers and acquirers of goods or services. An ability to exercise a dominant 
influence or to act independently in relation to the terms of supply or acquisition of 
goods or services suggests that for the purposes of the Act, there can, by definition, be 
no more than one firm at any one time, in a particular market, occupying a dominant 
position. The cases of Re Continental Car Company Inc.,36 Re News Ltd and Independent 
Newspapers Ltd,37 Re Magnum Corporation Ltd and Dominion Breweries Ltd,38 ___LlQn_ 
Corporation Ltd v Commerce Commission39 and the New Zealand Magic Millions40 
decision are all cases which support this interpretation of dominance. 
Australia 
The present form of section 46 of the Australian Act, on which section 46A is based, 
came into force in 1986 and prohibits firms with a "substantial degree of power in a 
market" from acting in specified anti-competitive ways. Prior to 1986, section 46 
referred to a corporation "being in a position substantially to control a market" . The 
1986 amendment was designed to lower the threshold for breach so that the section 
would apply not just to monopolists but, as the Attorney General stated in his Second 
Reading Speech, also "to major participants in any oligopolistic market and in some 
cases, to a leading firm in a less concentrated market". 
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The Explanatory Memorandum to the Trade Practices Amendment Bill, 1985 is 
illuminating in considering the significance of the legislative difference.41 The 
Memorandum contained the following statement: 
"46. A corporation having a 'substantial degree of market power' may have a lesser 
degree of market power than that of a corporation which 'would be or would be likely to be, 
in a position to ... dominate a market' ... 'Dominance' connotes a $reater degree of 
independence from the constraints of competition than is required by a substantial des.ree 
of market power'. Whatever the position in regard to 'dominance', more than one firm 
may have a 'substantial degree of power' in a particular market." 
The exact degree of market power that will constitute a "substantial degree of power" in 
a particular market is impossible to estimate precisely. On this point the Explanatory 
Memorandum noted that the word is used in several different contexts in the Act and 
that its meaning may change according to the context. Smithers J in Dandy Power 
Equipment Pty Ltd v Mercury Marine Pty Ltd42 stated that the word "substantial" 
imports "a greater rather than a less" degree of power. In the recent Federal Court of 
Australia decision in the Pont Data case43 Wilcox J reconfirmed his statement in the 
earlier decision in Mark Lyons Pty Ltd v Bursill Sportsgear Pty Ltd44 that the word 
"substantial" in section 46 of the Australian Act should be given the same meaning as in 
other references in that Act, such as in the phrase "substantially lessening competition" 
in section 45 meaning "more than trivial or minimal" or "not insubstantial or nominal". 
In the writer's view the concept of a "substantial degree of power" is an imprecise 
term. What is clear, is that in Australia more than one firm may hold that level of 
power in a particular market. Further, that level of market power will fall some way 
short of the degree of market power that is required under the Commerce Act to 
achieve the degree of independence of behaviour which typifies dominance. 
Market Power Summary 
Notwithstanding the inherent uncertainties that exist in applying the market power 
thresholds of section 46A of the Australian Act and section 36A of the Commerce Act, 
what is apparent is an obvious and intended difference between them.45 The 
Ministry of Commerce in its 1989 review of the Commerce Act stated that the difference 
was of limited significance. The Ministry's report noted that both New Zealand and 
Australia had recently considered the thresholds for the application of sections 36 and 
46 were appropriate to their domestic circumstances and that, consistent with the 
principle that domestic companies and those of Member States (under the CER 
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Agreement) should be treated equally within a free trade area, the same thresholds 
should also apply in the trans-Tasman context.46 It seems likely that this view was 
responsible for the drafting of section 36A in its present form. 
In the writer's view a number of anomalies currently present themselves: 
• A New Zealand firm competing or attempting to enter a market in Australia 
could bring an action under section 46A of the Australian Act against any 
company with a substantial degree of market power taking advantage of that 
position for one of the proscribed anti-competitive purposes. By contrast, an 
Australian firm attempting to enter or already competing in a market in New 
Zealand would not have an avenue of redress against anyone other than someone 
occupying a dominant position in a market. Thus it appears the position of a 
New Zealand firm in Australia, being subjected to predatory conduct, may in 
some cases be more favourable than the position of an Australian firm in this 
country, being subjected to such conduct. 
• The positions are reversed when considering exporting conduct. Assuming one 
of the proscribed anti-competitive purposes can be established, a New Zealand 
manufacturer exporting goods onto the Australian market will breach section 46A 
in Australia if it holds a substantial degree of market power in a New Zealand 
market. Contrast this with an Australian producer. Anti-competitive actions in 
the course of its export trade will escape the section 36A net if the producer has a 
substantial degree of market power but not a dominant market position in an 
Australian market. This is particularly significant in light of the relatively small 
number of Australian firms that will have sufficient market power to be dominant 
in an Australian market. 
• Suppose a company from either country is engaging in conduct which inhibits 
entry to or deters competitive conduct in markets in both Australia and New 
Zealand. In some circumstances the conduct may be illegal in Australia under the 
lower market threshold test yet legal in New Zealand if the company does not 
occupy a dominant position in any market in either country. 
In the writer's view the situations noted above evidence serious shortcomings in the 
trans-Tasman market power prohibitions in their present form. While there is no 
suggestion that the objectives of the CER Agreement always require, or will necessarily 
be met, by blanket duplication of business laws,47 one must question the extent to 
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which the competitive objectives underlying the CER Agreement are advanced by 
anti-trust legislation which treats similar trading conduct differently depending on 
which side of the Tasman Sea it occurs. 
The difficulty that exists in considering how to resolve this problem is that sections 36A 
and 46A cannot be considered in isolation. Those sections in turn are based on the 
market power thresholds prevailing in their respective domestic market power 
provisions: sections 36 and 46. It is not only desirable that anti-competitive conduct be 
treated similarly regardless of which side of the Tasman it occurs. If the aim of 
harmonisation of business laws is to remove impediments to business between New 
Zealand and Australia, as the writer submits it must be, it is also highly desirable that 
within each country, legislation treats similar conduct in the same way, regardless of 
whether the wrongdoer is a domestic company or a company carrying on business 2000 
kilometres across the Tasman. 
For these reasons, an alignment of the market power thresholds applying in section 
36A and section 46A is likely only to occur as part of a wider view of the parent 
sections. At the time of writing there is no indication that either government is 
contemplating any change to that aspect of its Act. For so long as this remains the case, 
the writer considers that, in time, examples of the disparity in treatment of 
trans-Tasman competitors as noted above, will emerge. 
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r_RANS-TASMAN TRADE IN SERVICES 
One of the outcomes of the 1988 Review of the CER Agreement was the signing of the 
CER Protocol on Trade in Services (the "Services Protocol") which came into effect on 1 
January 1989. While a number of service industries are excluded from the Services 
Protocol it nevertheless embodies a detailed framework for the development of free 
trade in services between New Zealand and Australia, and provides for the progressive 
inclusion of service sectors excluded from the Agreement at the time it was signed. 
This South Pacific development paralleled global trade politics where trading emphasis 
had traditionally been on goods. Only relatively recently has the extent to which 
services, such as telecommunications, transport and finance, facilitate and promote 
trade in goods, been recognised. 
This part of the paper looks at the Services Protocol and then addresses the extension of 
the new prohibitions on use of trans-Tasman market power, to markets for services.48 
Background to the Seruices Protocol 
In the international scene, considerable motivation came from the United States in the 
1979 Tokyo Round of GA TT and at the 1982 GA TT ministerial meeting in Geneva, to 
include services in trade negotiations. While the GA TT document itself was directed at 
trade in goods, some of its essential features were applicable. For this reason the 
United States chose GA TT as its forum for pursuing international service trade 
agreements. Responses from developed nations were mixed despite examples of 
services trade liberalisation taking place elsewhere in the world. 
In the 1986 Punta del Este conference, trade Ministers agreed to negotiate on services 
using general GA TT procedures. Their aim was "to establish a multi-lateral framework 
of principles and rules for trade in services, including elaboration of possible 
disciplines for individual sectors". Despite this ambition, it became clear in the 
Uruguay GATT Round that while a multi-lateral framework on rules could be set down 
(proceeding on the fundamental GA TT principles of most favoured nation, 
transparency and national treatment) negotiations between countries would have to be 
carried out separately. It was in this context that Australia and New Zealand (both 
active in supporting a services agreement in the Uruguay Round) negotiated the 
Services Protocol to the CER Agreement. 
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Protorol on Trade in Services 
The formal aims of the Services Protocol are as follows:49 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
to reduce the barriers to and expand trade in services between Australia and New 
Zealand; 
to improve the efficiency and competitiveness of the services sectors of the two 
Member States; 
to establish a framework of transparent rules to govern trade in services between 
Australia and New Zealand; and 
to facilitate competition in trade in services. 
The Services Protocol expressly extends to all aspects of services including the 
production, distribution, marketing and sale of a service, as well as its delivery. Some 
of its essential principles include the following: 
• Market Access50 
New Zealand and Australia suppliers are to be given equal rights of access to 
markets in each country. 
• National Treatment51 
With the exception of "prudential, fiduciary, health and safety or consumer 
protection reasons", New Zealand and Australian suppliers are to receive equal 
treatment, including, without limitation, subsidies from the government of either 
country. In other words, foreign services should be treated no less favourably 
than domestic services. 
• Most Favoured Nation52 
The "most favoured nation" principle requires that an advantage accorded to one 
party must be similarly accorded to all. The Service Protocol requires that in 
respect of services excluded by exemption, treatment of the other country can be 
no less favourable than for third countries. 
• Government Monopoly53 
Each government has agreed in respect of services excluded from the Services 
Protocol because of government monopoly, revenue from such monopoly is not 
to be used to cross-subsidise products and services which are competing with 
those supplied from the other country. 
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Significantly, the Services Protocol makes prov1s10n for a review of those services 
expressly exempted from it at the time of signing, with a view to the liberalisation of 
trade in such services.54 Australia and New Zealand may, at any time, either upon 
request of the other or unilaterally, remove, in whole or in part, services excluded by 
them, from the Services Protocol. The services currently exempted fall under the 
following headings: 
Australia 
• Telecommunications 
• Banking 
• Airport Services 
• Domestic Aviation 
• International Aviation 
• Coastal Shipping 
• Construction Engineering 
Consultancy 
• Broadcasting and Television 
• Basic Health Insurance -
Medicare 
• Third Party Insurance 
• Workers' Compensation 
Insurance 
• Postal Services 
New Zealand 
• Airways Services 
• International carriers -
cabotage 
• Radio ana Television 
Broadcasting 
• Shortwave and Satellite 
Broadcasting 
• Telecommunications 
• Postal Services 
• Coastal Shipping 
• Stevedoring 
Reactions to the Services Protocol were mixed, due to the significant service sectors 
(both in number and trade terms) excluded - many of which were government 
monopolies not private sector industries. One author noted that the Protocol appeared 
to simply codify the current sway of government interventions or monopoly powers in 
restraint of trade and, in the case of stevedoring and shipping, to tolerate those 
emanating from a protectionist trade union arrangement.55 Comments were also 
made as to the different advantages accorded to each country. 56 It is easier to 
appreciate why Australia showed more reluctance than New Zealand to ensure full and 
equal access to services when the relative market sizes are compared and the 
significance of reciprocal access is borne in mind. 
Notwithstanding such initial impressions the Services Protocol did provide for a 
governmental review prior to the end of December 1990. In a joint Prime Ministerial 
statement issued in July 1990 both countries reaffirmed their commitment to the further 
liberalisation of trade in services in accordance with the provisions of the Services 
Protocol and the intention that the exemption would be lifted from as many services as 
possible by 1 July 1995. New Zealand and Australian officials met in Canberra in 
December 1991 to discuss progress and noted that the process of micro-econimic reform 
underway in both countries was likely to lead to further changes in the respective 
inscriptions list over the period to 1 July 1995. 
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Trans-Tasman Market Provisions 
A Market Exclusively ,for Services 
As has already been noted, the 1 July 1990 amendment to the Commerce Act 1986 
investing section 36A does not extend to "a market exclusively for services". In other 
words, a New Zealand firm presently has no right of redress against an Australian 
company which is otherwise party to a contravention of the misuse of market power 
provisions in relation to a New Zealand market for services where the Australian 
company is not resident or carrying on business in New Zealand (and therefore caught 
by section 36). 
It is interesting at this point to note that section 36A of the Commerce Act and section 
46A of the Australian Act do apply to conduct affecting a domestic market for both 
goods and services. This raises the question of the nature of the markets contemplated 
by the provisions. The writer submits the section was intended to cover goods which 
are supplied with services of some type such as after sales services, maintenance or 
instruction. In the writer's view the section has been cast in its present form to avoid 
any suggestion that such items are not within the term "market for goods", had the 
section referred simply to a market for goods. Strictly the reference is not necessary as 
both the Commerce Act and the Australian Act note that references to the supply or 
acquisition of goods includes a reference to the supply or acquisition of goods together 
with other property or services or both.57 
The exclusion from the section of trans-Tasman conduct affecting "a market exclusively 
for services", contemplates those industries, the essence of which is the provision of a 
non-tangible service, albeit provided via a tangible form (for example, the provision of 
telecommunication or shipping services through the medium of a telephone system or 
ship). In a market "exclusively for services" the consumer will generally be paying for a 
right to use a certain facility and not some tangible object. 
Notwithstanding the conceptual differences between the concepts of "goods" and 
"services", the reader -will no doubt recognise the potential for legal argument as to 
whether a particular market is one "exclusively for services" or one made up of both 
"goods" and "services" components. 
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Trans-Tasman Services Market 
Against the backdrop of a political push (at least from this country) towards 
progressive elimination of the number of services exempted from the Services Protocol, 
an obvious issue presents itself: "Should the current trans-Tasman market power provisions 
be extended to include markets exclusively for services?" The Steering Committee of 
Officials in its June 1990 Report to Governments on the Memorandum of 
Understanding Between the Government of Australia and the Government of New 
Zealand on Harmonisation of Business Law ("the June 1990 Report") stated that it 
considered the prohibition on trans-Tasman anti-competitive use of market power 
should be so extended to markets for services. Unfortunately the June 1990 Report 
contains no discussion on the matter. 
Notwithstanding the current significant exclusions from the Services Protocol, the 
writer submits that there is no good reason in principle, why sections 36A and 46A 
should not protect markets which are exclusively for services. In light of the 
significance of the service industry to both economies, it is submitted the hole left by 
the current wording of the provision is a gaping one. At present no right of redress 
exists for a New Zealand resident attempting to enter a market for services in Australia 
in the event that an Australian company with a substantial degree of power in any 
market takes advantage of its position for the purpose of preventing the New Zealand 
firm entering. (If the company was already resident or carrying on business in 
Australia, section 46 of the Australian Act would apply.) Similarly a New Zealand firm 
with a dominant position in any market which uses its position for the purpose of 
restricting or preventing new entry by an Australian firm into a New Zealand market 
for services, may act without threat of Commerce Act proceedings. (Again, if the firm 
was already resident or carrying on business in New Zealand, section 36 of the 
Commerce Act would apply). 
In the writer's view this position is anomalous and inconsistent with the objectives in 
the CER Agreement of reducing the barriers to trade in services between New Zealand 
and Australia and expanding and facilitating competition in trade in services. The June 
1990 Report made provision for a further report on this issue to be prepared by officials 
by the end of June 1991. The wrtier had hoped that that report would take a similar 
view however at the time of writing that report is still to be released. 
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11tree Exempt Industries 
It is interesting to note briefly the competitive framework of three significant service 
sectors in Australia and New Zealand, each of which are currently exempted from the 
Services Protocol. 
Aviation 
Civil aviation was deregulated in this country prior to the signing of the Services 
Protocol and accordingly this industry appears only on the Australian list of exempt 
industries. The potential for New Zealand entry into the Australian domestic aviation 
market has become more topical since Australia's two airline policy terminated in 
October 1990 although initial indications from Australia were that outside investment 
would be limited to 15%. However, following the 1990 review of the Services Protocol, 
the Australian go,vernment announced it would lift limits to investments in Australian 
domestic airlines by foreign airlines operating in Australia, from 15% to 25% for an 
individual holding, and to 40% in aggregate. Until that occurs, Australian civil aviation 
effectively remains outside the CER umbrella. 
Competition in trans-Tasman aviation (being aviation within Australia and New 
Zealand as well as across the Tasman) was the subject of a recently released report 
entitled "Costs and Benefits of a Single Australasian Aviation Market" prepared by a joint 
Australia/New Zealand study team.58 The report was stated to have been prepared 
to assist the governments of both countries in considering whether the CER Agreement 
should be extended to include aviation services. 
For the purposes of the study the single aviation market was defined in terms of, inter 
alia, free market access for all Australasian airlines to all Australasian markets with no 
capacity restrictions or tariff controls and unrestricted cabotage (allowing Australian 
and New Zealand international carriers to carry domestic passengers in Australia). As 
freight services across the Tasman are now largely deregulated, the focus of the study 
was on the passenger sector of that market. A range of market scenarios were 
examined in the study, with varying degrees and combinations of deregulation on 
trans-Tasman and Australian domestic air routes. Under each scenario examined, 
consumers enjoyed reduced airfares and an improvement in the quality of air services. 
The report suggests that as far as the airlines are concerned, deregulation would create 
new opportunities for entrants, while subjecting incumbent carriers to the rigours of 
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new competition. Any aggregate loss of profits by the airlines, together with any losses 
to airline employees, was subtracted from the consumer gains to estimate the net 
welfare outcome. In each case examined, net welfare gains resulted. 
It is evident that the creation of a single aviation market (however that is ultimately 
defined) will have significant consequences for the economies of and relationship 
between both countries. From a legal perspective and for the furtherance of the CER 
objectives, the writer submits that what is most important is not that competition 
actually occurs throughout the Australasian aviation industry, but rather that a legal 
framework exists within which such conduct may occur if competitive forces so dictate. 
Telecommunications 
Full privatisation of the New Zealand government owned monopoly 
telecommunication industry occurred in June 1990. There are currently no regulatory 
barriers to Australian entry into the New Zealand telecommunications market. Like 
domestic airways, the Australian telecommunication industry is currently protected 
from foreign competition. It seems likely that full deregulation in Australia is a long 
way off although in the course of the 1990 review of the Services Protocol the 
Australian Prime Minister announced plans to introduce competition in the Australian 
telecommunications sector and to allow unrestricted competition in cordless telephone 
services. Until full deregulation occurs New Zealand will be unable to enter the 
Australian telecommunication market and provide real competition for the current 
dominant carriers. This state of affairs represents a significant hurdle in the free trade 
in services objective in the Services Protocol and, in the writer's view, will provide a 
stumbling block to full trans-Tasman competition. This is one area in which Australia's 
true commitment to liberalising free trade in services will be put to test in the months 
to come. 
Shipping 
Both New Zealand and Australia currently restrict coastal shipping to domestic carriers 
and have each included coastal shipping on the lists of excluded service industries in 
the Services Protocol. It seems, further, that the removal of either country's restriction 
in the near future will be slow. Stevedoring also features in the New Zealand list of 
exclusions, as a result of restrictions (industrial rather than legislative) relating to the 
handling of "less than container load". New Zealand did however indicate in the 
course of the 1990 Services Protocol review that it would be possible to remove this 
inscription. Australia has not imposed a similar restriction and competition from New 
Zealand firms would be possible on Australian wharfs. 
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In reflecting on the significant role played by the shipping industry in trans-Tasman 
trade in goods, the writer is of the view that a lack of competition in trans-Tasman 
shipping will provide a dramatic restraint on realisation of the aims of the CER 
Agreement overall. The large majority of New Zealand exports to Australia (worth 
NZ$2,609 million in 1988-89, representing 17.5% of New Zealand's total exports) were 
shipped to their Australian destination. Australia's exports to New Zealand in the 
same period were valued at A$2,210 million, although accounted for just over 5% of 
Australia's total exports. Profitability for such trade is severely affected by the terms of 
trade offered by trans-Tasman shipping companies. 
Notwithstanding these facts, a 1980 joint Australian Bureau of Transport Economies 
and New Zealand Ministry of Transport study entitled "Trans-Tasman Shipping", found 
that trans-Tasman shipping costs could be reduced by up to 33% by traders operating 
between Australia and New Zealand as part of a service to another part of the world. 
Writers of the report considered the absence of effective competition in trans-Tasman 
shipping is a major reason for the excessive costs. 
While there have been some attempts at waterfront reform in both Australia and New 
Zealand, high shipping charges across the Tasman remain. Their imposition serves to 
isolate the two countries in trade terms and poses, if not a major dis-incentive, a serious 
negative effect on the ability of manufacturers one either side of the Tasman to compete 
freely. It is clear that shipping is a major blemish on the CER track record and one 
which, if not positively addressed, must take its toll on the realisation of the CER 
objectives.59 
Summary 
While the 1988 signing of the Services Protocol was a significant development for both 
the New Zealand and Australian economies, in the writer's view, its effect is severely 
circumscribed by the industries exempted from its provisions. Those exempt 
industries are significant both in terms of the value of trade possible in relation to them 
and, more specifically, because of the effect that domestic protection of trans-Tasman 
shipping has on the competitiveness of trans-Tasman trade in goods in general. 
Officials from both countries in the course of the 1990 review agreed to consult further 
about the possible scope of amendments to the Service Protocol inscriptions of 
industries in which reform was either already in motion or contemplated. The Protocol 
will be reviewed again formally during the course of a proposed review of the CER 
Agreement in 1992. 
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Despite the best of stated intentions of legislators on both sides of the Tasman to fulfil 
the aims of the Services Agreement, the liberalisation of trade in the currently 
exempted industries will require significant government policy changes which in many 
of those industries, will not be without some opposition. The writer considers that at 
the end of the day, the real effectiveness of the Services Agreement and in turn the CER 
Agreement will rest on the willingness of each government to expose its presently 
protected service industries to competition from other Australasian firms. Until this 
occurs the aims of expanding trade in services and improving the efficiency and 
competitiveness of both New Zealand and Australian service sectors will remain as 
only partly fulfilled ideals. 
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OTHER RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES 
In its 1990 Report the Steering Committee report on Harmonisation of Business Laws 
made the following comments in relation to the extension of other trade practice 
prohibitions to trans-Tasman markets:60 
"The Steering Committee considers that the desirability of extending the extra-territorial 
reach of other provisions of the [ Commerce Act and the Australian Act] to trans-Tasman 
markets, in a similar manner to that in which ss46A/36A are to apply, should be given 
serious consideration. It regards this as a very important harmonisation issue." 
As previously noted, the report anticipated from officials in both countries on this issue 
has yet to be released. 
In the writer's view the possibility of harmonising further restrictive trade practice 
provisions requires consideration of the following issues: 
• To what extent do Australian and New Zealand restrictive trade practices laws 
involve similar tests? 
• What is the significance of the absence in the New Zealand Act of provisions 
covering secondary boycotts, exclusive dealing and price discrimination? 
• To what extent is amendment of either the New Zealand Commerce Act or the 
Australian Trade Practices Act required by the CER objectives? 
The Commerce Act regulates trade practices in five broad areas: arrangements 
substantially lessening competition; exclusionary provisions; price fixing; use of a 
dominant position in a market (which will not be discussed in this section); and resale 
price maintenance. (Extracts of these sections are set out in Appendix One.) The 
Australian Act focuses upon broadly similar practices while making additional 
provision for the practices of secondary boycotts, exclusive dealing and price 
discrimination. (Extracts of these sections are set out in Appendix Two.) The 
differences, where they exist, between the provisions in each country are discussed 
below along with the significance of those differences in terms of facilitating free and 
equal trade between New Zealand and Australia and permitting competition by a firm 
from one country within the other's jurisdiction. 
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Arrangements Substantially Lessening Competition 
The primary "catch all" prohibition in both Australia and New Zealand is one against 
the entering into or enforcement of any contract, arrangement or understanding 
(hereafter, "contract") which has the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of 
substantially lessening competition in a market. The relevant provisions, section 27 of 
the Commerce Act and section 45 of the Australian Act, are very similar in their terms 
and effect. There should be no real difficulty in extending the class of persons whose 
contracts will be subject to the provisions, to persons resident or carrying on business 
in New Zealand, or Australia, as the case may be, to the extent that conduct affects a 
market in Australia, or New Zealand, respectively. 
One significant difference between the two sections is that section 45 of the Australian 
Act does not apply to a contract or a proposed contract insofar as it provides for the 
acquisition of any shares in the capital or any assets of a body corporate.61 
Unfortunately in New Zealand, section 27 currently applies to any contract from the 
acquisition of assets of a business or shares from any person unless the assets or shares 
are acquired in accordance with a current clearance or authorisation.62 This position, 
which emerged from the hurried passage of the Commerce Amendment Bill 1990 
through Parliament, results in some anomalies. One of the most obvious is that where 
parties to an acquisition consider their proposal does not require clearance, since no 
person is in a dominant position as a result of the acquisition, but may substantially 
lessen competition, they may apply for clearance nevertheless so as to avoid possible 
exposure to section 27. Another, is that specific protection from section 27 is given only 
while a clearance or authorisation is in force. Clearances and authorisiations remain in 
force for a 12 month period, suggesting that after that period has passed the protection 
given by the Act ceases. It would be absurd if this was the case for the protection given 
against the business acquisiton regime in section 47 of the Act. The position of cleared 
acquisitions viz section 27 is less certain. 
Section 27 should not in the writer's view apply to acquisitions of shares or assets . The 
Commerce Act needs to be amended, preferably immediately, but at the latest, by such 
time as section 45 of the Australian Act and section 27 of the Commerce Act are given 
extraterritorial application. Until this occurs, acquisitions which take place in New 
Zealand may face an additional hurdle of avoiding section 27 of the Commerce Act, 
where no similar hurdle exists in Australia. The writer considers the New Zealand 
position to be anomalous and inconsistent with the much used "level playing field" 
ideal which is the backbone of the fundamental principals of the CER Agreement. 
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Exclusionary Provisions 
Section 29 of the Commerce Act and section 45 of the Australian Act both prohibit the 
entering into, or the giving effect to, of any exclusionary provisions. The Australian 
Act defines a provision of a contract to be exclusionary if:63 
(i) the contract is made between persons any 2 or more of whom are "competitive" 
with each other, meaning those parties (or any interconnected body corporate) 
are, or are likely to be, or, but for the provision of any contract would be, or 
would be likely to be, in competition with each other; and 
(ii) the provision has the purpose of preventing or restricting the supply or 
acquisition of goods or services to or from particular persons in particular 
circumstances or on particular conditions by all or any of the parties to the 
contract (including a related body corporate). 
Since July 1990 New Zealand's definition of an exclusionary provision has differed 
from Australia's in that in addition to the elements referred to above, the particular 
person or class of persons to which the provision relates must be in competition with 
one or more of the parties to the contract.64 Prior to July 1990, it was considered that 
without this third limb to the definition of exclusionary provision the section applied 
too widely.65 
The application of section 29 of the Commerce Act is now severely more limited than 
the application of the equivalent Australian provision. The requirement that the 
person to whom supply is to be restricted (or from whom acquisition is to be restricted) 
must be in competition with at least one party to the contract, means that the classic 
market share arrangement where the "victim" is a supplier or an acquirer of the 
restricted goods or services but not a competitor of any party to the contract with 
respect to those goods or services will not be caught. Such market share arrangements 
will currently be caught by the Australian Act. 
Notwithstanding the individual merits or otherwise of the two exclusionary provision 
sections, the fact remains that in their present form their scope differs. While in some 
cases brought under section 29, an action under section 27 may also be made out,66 
this will of course only be possible if the purpose or effect or likely effect of the contract 
is to substantially lessen competition.67 Such purpose or effect will not always be 
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present and for this reason, prior to its amendment, section 29 provided in the writer's 
view a useful backup section for a victim of collusive conduct designed to restrict 
supply to or acquisition from it. Unless that victim is in competition with at least one 
of the parties to the contract it will find no relief in this country. 
For the purposes of section 29, a person is in competition with another if that person or 
any interconnected body corporate is or is likely to be in competition with the other 
person. This results in the anomalous position in New Zealand, that if the victim 
retailer, which is not in competition with either party to the contract, has a wholesaling 
parent in competition with the parties to the restrictive contract which relates to all 
companies within the victim's group, section 29 may apply. If however the victim's 
parent is a non trading holding company, no relief exists for the victim under the 
section. 
The effect of the different exclusionary provisions in Australia and New Zealand means 
that Australia is providing relief under its Act for a type of anti-competitive conduct, 
namely market share arrangements, which will in most cases escape the Commerce Act 
net, other than in those limited cases where the victim competes with one of the 
contracting parties or in cases where the arrangement substantially lessens competition 
in a market. 
In the writer's view a good argument exists that in both countries the prohibition on 
exclusionary provision should be removed for the reason that if collusive conduct is 
significant in competition terms, it will come within the substantial lessening of 
competition clauses in any event. If the specific prohibitions are to remain, the 
legislative differences must be addressed when the extraterritorial effect of the sections 
is being considered. As exclusionary conduct is currently authorisable in both 
countries it would be prudent in that event to return in New Zealand to the pre-July 
1990 position for the identification of exclusionary provisions. If the two sections are 
given extraterritorial application without their terms being harmonised, we will be left 
with the undesirable possibility of some market share arrangements being permitted if 
they occur in New Zealand but not if they occur in Australia. 
Price Fixing 
Section 30 of the Commerce Act and section 45A of the Australian Act each deem a 
provision of a contract to substantially lessen competition for the purposes of section 27 
and 45, respectively, if the provision has the purpose or has or is likely to have the 
effect of fixing, controlling or maintaining, or providing for the fixing or controlling or 
maintaining of the price for or any discount, allowance, rebate or credit in relation to, 
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goods or services that are, or are to be, supplied or acquired by any of the parties to the 
contract or any related bodies corporate in competition with each other. In addition, 
the sections extend to such a provision in relation to goods or services that are 
resupplied by persons to whom the goods are supplied by any of the parties to the 
contract or any related body corporate thereof, that are in competition with each other. 
Exempted from both of these deeming provisions are certain agreements for the 
purposes of a joint venture; certain recommendations as to prices for the supply or 
acquisition of goods or services where the parties thereto are not less than 50 in 
number; and certain agreements relating to the price of goods collectively acquired or 
the joint advertising of the price for the resupply of goods so acquired.68 
The number of price fixing cases in New Zealand and Australia have been relatively 
few. It seems clear from a review of those cases that have proceeded to the Commerce 
Commission, Trade Practice Commission or the Courts that a reasonably standard 
approach has been taken in both countries to what are essentially identical 
provisions.69 One possible exception to this stems from the Full Federal Court of 
Australia's decision in Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Limited v Stereo FM Ptv Limited70 where 
the Court found that the issuing of a rating card for advertising on two unrelated radio 
stations did not breach section 45A of the Australian Act because each station 
separately fixed its own rate. In the course of that decision the Court stated that there 
must be "an element of intention or likelihood to affect price competition before price 
"fixing" can be established. 
Such an approach is contrary to the strict terms of the Australian and New Zealand 
price fixing provisions which each require only that the proscribed effect of fixing be 
established. While in the writer's view it is doubtful that the Radio 2UE case can be 
taken to have imposed an additional element to be made out by a plaintiff in a price 
fixing action, it is likely that in any case in which an effect of price fixing (likely or 
actual) is shown, that some element of "intention or likelihood to affect price 
competition" will necessarily exist. Sections 30 of the Commerce Act and 45A of the 
Australian Act are two sections which will not in the writer's view require amendment 
either for the general objectives of the CER Agreement or in the event that 
trans-Tasman effect is in time accorded to price fixing contracts. 
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Resale Price Maintenance 
Both the Commerce Act and the Australian Act prohibit any person from engaging in 
the practice of resale price maintenance, being a form of vertical control where either a 
manufacturer or dealer is responsible for a price floor being set, below which goods 
cannot be sold at retail. Each Act contains detailed provisions defining acts that 
constitute resale price maintenance for the purposes of the legislation. Although not 
identical in form, both Acts, subject to the comments below, detail substantially the 
same acts in defining the practice of resale price maintenance. They include both 
unilateral acts of a supplier, such as a refusal to supply for the reason that goods have 
been resold below a specified price (indirect resale price maintenance), and joint 
practices, where both supplier and purchaser agree to a minimum resale price (direct 
resale price maintenance). Both Acts exclude from the practice of resale price 
maintenance recommendations as to resale price provided it is clear that there is no 
obligation upon the ultimate seller to comply with the recommendation.71 
At the time of writing there have been no applications filed with the New Zealand 
Commerce Commission for authorisations for resale price maintenance and only a 
small volume of judicial discussion of the provisions.72 Australia has, as could be 
expected, a growing body of jurisprudence in relation to its resale price maintenance 
prohibition73 and it seems probably that the New Zealand Courts will made every 
reasonable endeavour to attempt to see the two countries' provisions interpreted 
consistently. 
Some differences do exist between the retail price maintenance provisions in Australia 
and New Zealand. Those differences are as follows: 
(i) The Commerce Act prohibits any "person" from engaging in resale price 
maintenance. This may occur by reason of agreements with or unilateral acts 
towards, any other "person". Under the Australian Act no corporation may 
engage in resale price maintenance in relation to a "second person", while a 
person (not being a corporation) will come within the section only where that 
person carries out an act of resale price maintenance where the person to whom 
the goods are supplied is a corporation. In other words, suppose in Australia 
two non-corporate persons enter into an agreement for the supply of goods from 
one to the other on the condition that the person being supplied will not sell the 
goods at a price less than the price specified by the supplier. This agreement 
will not amount to resale price maintenance as defined by the Australian Act. In 
Australia the supplier may be a natural person only if the entity receiving 
supply is a corporation. 
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(ii) The Commerce Act contains a prohibition on third party resale price 
maintenance which is not covered by the Australian Act. Section 38 of the 
Commerce Act prohibits any person (referred to as the "third party"): 
(a) making it known to another person that the third party proposes to engage 
in conduct (either alone or in concert with another) that will hinder or 
prevent the supply of any goods to, or the acquisition of any goods from, 
that person unless that person agrees not to sell those goods at a price less 
than the price specified by the third party; or 
(b) engaging in conduct (either alone or in concert with another) that will 
hinder or prevent the supply of goods to, or the acquisition of goods from, 
another person for the purpose of inducing that person not to sell those 
goods at a price less than a price specified by the third party, 
Section 38(2) defined "specified price" for the purpose of the third party resale 
price maintenance prohibition. 
(iii) Since July 1990 New Zealand has made resale price maintenance an authorisable 
trade practice.74 In Australia it remains a per se offence. 
The fact that the Australian resale price maintenance provisions do not apply to natural 
persons supplying goods unless the entity receiving the supply is a corporation will 
probably not be a significant issue in most cases. When both parties to resale price 
maintenance are natural persons, it is unlikely (although not inconceivable) that the 
volume of goods being supplied will constitute a significant proportion of the market 
to which they relate. 
The issue of third party resale price maintenance is a matter which needs further 
consideration by officials. The practice does not appear to be a common one in New 
Zealand. While the writer's view, this is not sufficient reason to abandon it for the sake 
of consistency between the two Acts, it does suggest that if agreement cannot be 
reached between the two countries on this issue, the matter, in practice, may not be 
overly significant 
With respect to authorisation of resale price maintenance, the writer considers that this 
is a matter which requires amendment of the Australian Act. It is now widely 
recognised, at least outside of Australia, that in some instances, resale price 
maintenance may have pro-competitive effects.75 Provision in the Australian Act 
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permitting authorisations of the practice will not only reflect current thinking but also 
permit companies operating in Australia the same ability as exists in New Zealand in 
appropriate cases, to stipulate resale prices. 
Secondary Boycotts, Exclusive Dealing and Price Discrimination 
Unlike the Australian Act, the Commerce Act does not contain express prohibitions 
against the practices of second boycotts, exclusive dealing and price discrimination. 
The Australian Act contains detailed provisions setting out the conduct that will 
constitute those practices. 
Secondary Boycotts 
Primary boycotts have already been referred to under the earlier discussion on 
exclusionary provisions. Section 450 of the Australia Act is directed at what are 
commonly termed "secondary boycotts" which arise when one group of people cause 
another group to refuse to deal with the target of the boycott. Section 450 prohibits 
one person, in concert with another, from engaging in conduct which hinders the 
supply of goods or services by a third person to, or the acquisition of goods or services 
by a third person from, a corporation ("the target"). That conduct must have both the 
purpose and effect, or likely effect, of causing either substantial loss to the corporation's 
business, or a substantial lessening of competition in any market in which the target or 
a related body corporate supplies or acquires goods or services. In addition, section 
450(1A) prohibits two or more persons engaging in conduct that hinders another 
person engaging in overseas or interstate trade or commerce. 
For a number of reasons, Section 450 is an unusual provision in the regulation of 
restrictive trade practices. First, liability depends on establishing both purpose and 
effect, whereas all other provisions require one or other of those facts be established. 
Secondly, the causing of loss to an individual suffices for liability. Thirdly, it brings 
within the Australian Act the behaviour of trade unions, a matter outside the normal 
bounds of anti-trust legislation which focuses on combinations of market strength 
rather than combinations of labour. Finally, the section does not apply to corporations 
acting in a proscribed fashion but rather to those who act to injure corporations. The 
section was enacted upon the recommendation of the Swanson Committee76 to 
prevent trade in some industries being affected by employees who feared loss of jobs in 
the face of price competition. Boycotts by petrol tanker drivers against price cutting 
service stations in Australia in the early 1970' s were a source of much complaint. 
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There is clearly some overlap in the application of section 450 with section 45 of the 
Australian Act in that to the extent the arrangement or agreement to boycott has the 
purpose or effect of substantially lessening competition in a market, the matter will be 
actionable under both of those sections. Section 27 of the Commerce Act, being, as 
already discussed, in substantially similar terms to section 45 of the Australian Act, will 
provide relief in New Zealand in similar circumstances for targets of secondary 
boycotts. Unlike section 450 of the Australian Act, the market in which a substantial 
lessening of competition must occur for the purposes of section 27 of the Commerce 
Act, need not be a market in which the victim of the agreement to boycott, itself 
supplies or acquires goods or services. Section 3(4) of the Commerce Act which defines 
market for the purpose of section 27, is framed in inclusive terms only. 
Where section 450 does provide more extensive coverage than is found anywhere in 
the Commerce Act is in respect of secondary boycotts which do not substantially lessen 
competition in any market but have the purpose and effect (actual or likely) of causing 
substantial loss or damage to the business of the target. In the writer's view this is not a 
discrepancy which the goals of the development of trade between New Zealand and 
Australia and the harmonisation of restrictive trade practices between the two 
countries, demand rectifying. The New Zealand legislature has determined that 
agreements relating to trading conduct should be prohibited only where they have the 
purpose or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in any market. In all 
other cases (with the exception of per se offences) trading entities are free to determine 
their own business relationships. 
Exclusive Dealing 
Section 47 of the Australian Act prohibits a corporation, in trade or commerce, from 
engaging in the practice of exclusive dealing.77 Such practice, in general terms, 
involves the corporation supplying or offering to supply goods or services, either 
generally or at a particular price, or giving or allowing a discount, rebate or allowance 
in relation thereto, on the condition that the person to whom the corporation supplies 
(etc) (including any related body corporate) will not acquire or resupply certain goods 
or services from or to, a competitor of the corporation (or a related body corporate), or 
will acquire from or resupply to only certain classes of persons or persons in certain 
places.78 
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The definition of exclusive dealing also extends to a refusal by the corporation to 
supply goods or services to any person for the reason that that person (or a related 
body corporate) has not limited its supply or acquisition of goods as directed by the 
supplier in a manner referred to above.79 Acquisitions or offers to acquire goods or 
services subject to any similar term of exclusivity will also amount to an act of exclusive 
dealing.BO 
Third line forcing is also prohibited by the Australian Act under the exclusive dealing 
"umbrella".81 That practice involves a corporation supplying or offering to supply 
goods or services or giving or allowing a discount rebate or allowance in relation 
thereto, on the condition that the person to whom the corporation supplies (etc.) 
(including any related body corporate) will acquire goods or services of a particular 
kind or description from another person. Refusals to supply, for non compliance, are 
also caught.82 
Third line forcing will be caught by the section regardless of its actual competitive 
effects. The other types of exclusive dealing referred to above will only be subject to 
the prohibition against exclusive dealing if the engaging by the corporation (alone or 
with any related body corporate) in that conduct (including other conduct of a similar 
kind) has the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening 
competition in any market.83 
A corporation in Australia engaging or proposing to engage in exclusive dealing 
conduct , other than third line forcing, may avoid liability by lodging a notification 
thereof, with the Trade Practices Commission.84 Where a notification has been lodged 
the corporation's conduct is deemed not to have a substantial lessening effect on 
competition for the purposes of section 47. Protection can be withdrawn by the 
Commission if it is satisfied that the conduct is likely to have a substantially lessening 
effect on competition which is not outweighed by the public benefit likely to result 
therefrom. It is also possible in Australia to seek authorisation from the Commission 
for an exclusive dealing practice.SS 
In New Zealand, many exclusive dealing practices fall for examination under the 
general provisions of section 27 of the Commerce Act, already referred to. The case of 
Fisher & Pavkel Limited v Commerce Commission86 is a good example of this. For this 
reason most exclusive dealing practices will be examined against similar legal tests, 
regardless of under which country's legislation they fall to be examined. There are 
some exceptions to this: 
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(a) In Australia third line forcing is, prima facia, prohibited, regardless of its 
competitive effect. In New Zealand, supplying goods or services on the 
condition that the purchaser acquires other goods from a third party must have 
the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in a 
market before it will come within section 27 of the Commerce Act; 
(b) Refusing to supply goods or services because the purchaser has dealt, or refused 
to cease dealing, in a competition's products, or has failed to accept some 
restriction on resupply or refuses to also acquire other goods from a third party, 
will not involve a "contract, arrangement or understanding". Accordingly, 
section 27 will not apply to those types of exclusive dealing. Such refusals may 
be caught in appropriate circumstances, if at all, by section 36. 
New Zealand officials have in the past expressed the view that a specific exclusive 
dealing clause is not required in the Commerce Act due to the wide coverage of section 
27.87 With the exception of third line forcing and the refusals to supply, just referred 
to, the writer is of the view that this is the correct position. Further amendment to 
either Act can, in terms of the CER Agreement and the declared aim of harmonising 
business laws, only be justified if real inconsistencies in application exist between the 
two Acts. 
In relation to third line forcing and the refusals to supply which come within the 
definition of exclusive dealing in the Australian Act, the discrepancy is clear. While 
third line forcing may be a less common form of exclusive dealing, the writer takes the 
view that that is insufficient reason to maintain the difference in treatment accorded to 
that practice, if trans-Tasman application is to be given to the provisions. In relation to 
the more typical forms of exclusive dealing where supply is made, subject to certain 
exclusivity requirements, the writer is of the view that section 27 is sufficiently 
consistent with the Australian position for the objectives of the CER Agreement and 
provides suitable coverage for such practices. 
Price Discrimination 
Like exclusive dealing, price discrimination is a practice expressly addressed in the 
Australian Act but left, in New Zealand, to the more general coverage provided, in 
appropriate circumstances, by other provisions of Part II of the Commerce Act. 
Section 49 of the Australian Act deals with the problem of a seller discriminating in its 
dealings with different customers. It prohibits a vendor discriminating between buyers 
of goods "of like grade and quality" in relation to: the price charged for goods; 
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discounts allowed; credits, rebates or allowances given; services given with the goods; 
or payment arrangements for services provided with the goods. Such discrimination is 
prohibited if it is of such a magnitude or of such a recurring or systematic character that 
it has, or is likely to have, the effect of substantially lessening competition in a market 
in which the corporation, or the persons the subject of the discrimination, supplies 
goods. Price discrimination will not be caught by the section if the defendant vendor 
establishes that such discrimination makes only reasonable allowance for the cost 
differences in manufacture, distribution, sale or delivery, or is constituted by action 
taken in good faith to meet a price or benefit offered by a competitor. 
The section is a contentious one and its repeal was recommended by both the Swanson 
Committee and the now defunct Trade Practices Consultative Committee in 
Australia.88 It is highly debatable whether price discrimination, which is a per se 
offence incapable of authorisation, will necessarily be more anti- than 
pro-competitive.89 Further, in view of the complexity of the elements of an unlawful 
price discrimination, it has been suggested the section may be of dubious value in 
affording protection to a person suffering discrimination.90 There have been 
relatively few cases of price discrimination which have been successfully brought in 
Australia.91 The Australian Trade Practices Commission has noted that normally 
only the most significant suppliers in a market could engage in price discrimination 
that substantially lessens competition.92 
For the purposes of section 27 of the Commerce Act (as well as section 45 of the 
Australian Act), a provision of a contract will be deemed to have the effect of 
substantially lessening competition if it has that effect when looked at with the 
provisions of any other contract to which the person is a party. Accordingly, the extent 
to which a supplier's discrimination is evidenced by two or more contracts, the general 
prohibition in that section will apply to a case of price fixing in any event. 
It is conceivable that price discrimination might meet the section 36 criteria on the basis 
that the vendor occupies a dominant position and its discriminatory pricing policy had 
one of the anti-competitive purposes proscribed by that section. To the extent that 
price discrmination exists in New Zealand and does not meet the tests imposed by 
section 27 or 36, it will probably not be subject to any other regulation under the 
Commerce Act. In light of the uncertainty that presently surrounds Australia's price 
discrimination provision it would be unwise at this stage for New Zealand to take any 
action to remedy the difference between the two Acts in this area. Rather the 
discrepancy, albeit not of major significance in practice, should be noted. 
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TRANS TASMAN MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
A comparison of New Zealand and Australia's respective merger legislation reveals 
two merger regimes which are already largely harmonised. The market power 
thresholds in both countries is 'dominance' and broadly similar administrative 
procedures are employed in each. While there have been only a small number of recent 
mergers that have affected markets in both countries, the Government Steering 
Committee on Harmonisation noted an increasing number of such mergers in its 1990 
Report.93 This fact the Committee noted, has given rise to suggestions that there 
should exist a common mechanism for the consideration of merger proposals that have 
a trans-Tasman dimension. The 1990 Report contained no formal recommendation on 
this point but stated that the matter should be given further consideration.94 
This section of the paper outlines the current merger regimes in Australia and New 
Zealand and some of the differences between them. It also considers the necessity or 
desirability of the introduction of a formal procedure for the consideration of mergers 
affecting markets located in both countries. New Zealand and Australia's merger 
regimes are both currently based around a voluntary notification procedure. (Extracts 
of the relevant sections in both Acts are set out Appendices Three and Four.) Criticism 
has been levelled in both jurisdictions at their respective merger procedures and review 
has been mooted. No doubt in carrying out any review both New Zealand and 
Australia will be mindful of the procedures applying in the other country and, one 
hopes, the wider implications of any change in terms of the objectives of the CER 
Agreement. 
The Merger and Acquisition Regimes in New Zealand and Australia 
New Zealand Acquisitions 
In New Zealand, the acquisition of any shares or assets of a business may be made 
without Commerce Commission consent provided the acquisition will not result or be 
likely to result in any person being in or strengthening a dominant market position.95 
In broad terms, where the parties consider dominance is likely to result the transaction 
should (with the exception of bare transfers of market power which are expressly 
excluded from the provisions) proceed only with the prior clearance or authorisation of 
the Commerce Commission. Clearance will be granted where the Commission is 
satisfied that the acquisition will not result or be likely to result in any person being in 
or strengthening a dominant position in a market.96 Authorisation will be granted 
where the public benefits flowing from a proposal are such that, notwithstanding 
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the resulting level of dominance, the proposal should be authorised.97 If clearance or 
authorisation is not obtained for a transaction which does result in market dominance 
being acquired or strengthened, the Commerce Act makes provision for the transaction 
to be unwound and the parties subjected to significant penalties.98 
The New Zealand legislation casts a wide dominance net in relation to business 
acquisitions. For the purpose of determining whether an acquisition will result or be 
likely to result in any person occupying or strengthening a dominant market position, 
where two or more persons are "interconnected" or "associated" and together are in a 
dominant position in a market, each of them is deemed to be in a dominant position in 
that market.99 Persons are defined as "interconnected" if one of them is a body 
corporate of which the other is a subsidiary, both of them are subsidiaries of the same 
body corporate, or both of them are interconnected with bodies corporate that are so 
interconnected. loo The Act provides that one person will be "associated" with another 
if that person is able (directly or indirectly) to exert a substantial degree of influence 
over the activities of the other.IOI While the test for a substantial degree of influence 
is not entirely clear,102 the Act provided that such influence is not exerted by one 
person over another, by reason only of the fact that the persons are in competition in 
the same market or that one of them supplies goods or services to the other.103 
Also relevant in assessing the scope of New Zealand's business acquisition regime is 
section 4(1) of the Commerce Act which provides that the Act extends to the engaging 
in conduct outside New Zealand by any person resident or carrying on business in 
New Zealand, to the extent that such conduct affects a market in New Zealand. The 
precise scope of section 4(1) is unclear. While on its face it appears to permit the 
Commerce Commission to intervene in merger transactions which take place outside 
New Zealand yet affect a New Zealand market, the normal rules of territorial 
application mean that the extended jurisdiction is limited to conduct of persons 
resident or carrying on business in New Zealand. In the writer's view the section does 
not provide a basis upon which the Commerce Commission could intervene in a 
business acquisition occurring in Australia which may have some effect on a market in 
New Zealand. 
It is interesting to note the reference in section 4(1) to "engaging in conduct" . The 
phrase "engaging in conduct" is defined in section 2(2) of the Act in terms which 
suggest that section contemplates trade practice activity rather than merger activity. 
Section 2(2) states that a reference to engaging in conduct shall be read as reference to 
doing or refusing to do any act including the entering into, or giving effect to, a 
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prov1s1on of a contract or arrangement; the arnvmg at, or the giving effect to a 
provision of, an understanding; or the requiring of the giving of, or the giving of a 
covenant. All of these phrases are of course phrases used in sections 27 and 28 of the 
Act relating to contracts, arrangements, understandings and covenants substantially 
lessening competition. In the writer's view section 4(1) is more readily applicable to 
restrictive trade practices than business acquisitions and is of limited assistance in 
examining acquisitions which take place offshore but affect a New Zealand market. 
The issue remains a moot point. 
In its June 1990 Report the Steering Committee of Officials stated that it considered that 
acquisitions taking place outside New Zealand that affect New Zealand markets will be 
subject to the Commerce Act as a result of section 4 of that Act.104 The writer 
respectfully submits that the position is not as clear as the officials have suggested. In 
light of the normal rules of territorial application of state laws one would have 
expected the business acquisition regime in the Commerce Act to have expressly 
acknowledged the extension of its provisions to overseas acquisitions and the power of 
our Commerce Commission to investigate overseas mergers, if this indeed was the 
case. While the Australian Act contains a provision similar to that in section 4 of the 
Commerce Act, it was nevertheless still considered necessary there to enact section SOA 
(discussed below) setting out the extended jurisdiction of the Act's merger procedures 
to mergers occurring outside Australia and affecting a market within. 
It is also interesting to note that when the Commerce Law Reform Bill 1988 was 
introduced, it gave the Commerce Commission extraterritorial jurisdiction in respect of 
overseas mergers which created or strengthened dominance in New Zealand markets. 
The provision was removed prior to the Bill coming into force. It is unclear whether 
this occurred because it was considered undesirable for such extraterritorial 
jurisdiction to exist or because, on reflection, it was considered that section 4 already 
covered acquisitions occurring outside New Zealand affecting markets within New 
Zealand. 
Acquisitions in Australia 
Section 50 of the Australian Act relates to and proscribes acquisitions of shares and 
assets between a corporation (defined as a foreign corporation, or Australian trading or 
financial corporation, or holding company of any of them) and a body corporate. It 
prohibits acquisitions of shares or assets of a body corporate (other than bare transfers) 
if they result in a corporation being, or being likely to be, in a position to dominate a 
market for goods or services, or, substantially strengthen the power of a corporation 
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that is already in a position to dominate a market (but only if the body corporate 
acquired (or a related or associated body corporate) is or is likely to be a competitor of 
the corporation). 
The Australian Trade Practices Commission will only authorise an acquisition with any 
of these affects if it is satisfied that the acquisition will result or be likely to result in 
such a benefit to the public that it should be allowed to take place.105 This resultant 
public benefit has been described as "a net or overall benefit after any detriment to the 
public resulting or likely to result from the acquisition has been taken into 
account".106 The Australian Act permits a corporation to enter into a contract to 
acquire shares or assets, expressed to be subject to a grant of authorisation107. Where 
parties proceed to acquire assets or shares, contrary to the procedure in the Act, a range 
of remedies exists broadly similar to those in the Commerce Act.108 
As a result of recent amendments, similar provisions exists in the Australian Act to 
those in the Commerce Act in relation to related and associated companies for the 
purposes of assessing dominance. Section 50 will now catch mergers if:109 
(i) any company associated with, not just related to, the acquiree body corporate is 
or is likely to be a competitor of the dominant corporation; 
(ii) any company associated with, not just related to, a corporation acquires another 
body corporate in circumstances: 
(a) that result in the corporation becoming dominant; or 
(b) where the corporation is already dominant, the acquired body corporate 
(or an associated or related body corporate) is or is likely to be a 
competitor of the dominant corporation and the acquisition substantially 
strengthens the dominant corporation's power. 
It has been suggested that these amendments were made to overcome the difficulties 
faced in TPC v Australian Iron & Steel, BHP and Ors.110 
As in New Zealand's regime, section 50 of the Australian Act extends to mergers 
occurring outside Australia only to the extent that the parties thereto are "incorporated 
or carrying on business within Australia" or "Australian citizens or persons ordinarily 
resident within Australia". More significantly, and unlike New Zealand, the Australian 
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legislation provides the Trade Practices Tribunal with extraterritorial powers in related 
to acquisitions occurring outside Australia which affect markets within. Under section 
SOA of the Australian Act the Trade Practices Tribunal is empowered to make a 
declaration ordering a party, who or which has acquired goods in the preceding 12 
months, to cease carrying on business in a stated market. In effect, the provision 
operates as a divestment order. Power to make the declaration exists where: 
(i) a person acquires, outside Australia, a controlling interest in any body corporate 
(including control via a subsidiary company); and 
(ii) the body corporate thereby obtains a controlling interest in one or more 
"corporations"; and 
(iii) the controlling interest either puts, or is likely to put, the person in a position to 
dominate a substantial market for goods or services in Australia, or an 
Australian State or Territory, or substantially strengthens the person's existing 
dominance in that market; and 
(iv) the net result of the acquisition is not a benefit to the public such that the 
acquisition should be disregarded. 
To date there have been no cases decided under Australia's section SOA. It seems clear 
however, that the Tribunal's power is a very wide one. In the writer's view it provides 
Australian businesses with a level of comfort in relation to foreign mergers, which is 
clearly absent in New Zealand. 
Australia and New Z'.ealand Legislative Comparisons 
While the business acquisition tests and procedures under the Commerce Act are 
broadly similar to those set out in the merger provisions in the Australian Act, some 
differences do exist. They include the following: 
(i) For the purpose of New Zealand's merger regime a market is "a market in New 
Zealand for goods or services as well as other goods or services that, as a matter 
of fact and commercial common sense, are substitutable for them".111 By 
contrast, section 50(3)(a) of the Australian Act states that a reference in section 50 
of the Act to a market for goods or services is to be construed as a reference "to a 
substantial market for goods or services in Australia, in a State, or in a 
Territory". It appears from those references that some mergers in Australia 
which result in dominance, will nevertheless escape the section 50 regime if that 
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resulting dominance is not in respect of a substantial market. By contrast, it is 
clear from the New Zealand legislation that once the boundaries of a particular 
market have been delineated, section 47 of the Commerce Act will be 
contravened if the acquisition resulting in any person being in or strengthening a 
dominant position. It matters not in New Zealand that the market is not 
"substantial", however that term might be defined. 
While section 50(3)(a) of the Australian Act has not been the subject of judicial 
comment, the meaning of the provision has been said to be as follows:112 
"The market must be "substantial" in a State of Australia, and if, for example, 
one is seeking to acquire a corporation whose main activities are confined to but 
spread across a particular State, say, New South Wales, it should not now undo 
the acquisition merely because tlte merger will remove a significant degree of 
competitive conduct m, say, Newcastle. In other words the matter should be 
looked at according to the spread of activity of the merged enterprise across the 
whole State, and not merely, or necessarily, one part of it." 
While the precise scope of section 50(3)(a) remains unclear it seems that the 
restriction imposed by it has been of little significance in merger cases in 
Australia. In the writer's view the section makes it clear that the merger regime 
in the Act is not concerned with acquisitions which affect markets that are so 
small and, in trade terms, insignificant, that they raise no real competition 
concerns. 
It is however difficult to image an example of a market in which an acquisition 
of dominance will be of no competitive concern. For this reason, the absence in 
the Commerce Act of a requirement that a market affected by a merger be a 
"substantial market" will in all likelihood not be of significant practical concern 
for those proposing business acquisitions in New Zealand. In the writer's view 
the legislative difference does not, despite first impressions, create a more 
disadvantageous trading regime in this country than exists in Australia. 
(ii) A further qualification to the terms of the Australian legislation is that a person 
who is already dominant in an Australian market will be prohibited by section 
50 from acquiring the shares in another, only if that existing dominance will be 
substantially strengthened.113 The New Zealand provision will catch any 
acquisition which results in a person's existing dominant position being 
strengthened, by any amount. On its face, the terms of the New Zealand section 
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appear to disadvantage New Zealand companies when compared with the 
Australian provision which clearly anticipates some degree of permissible 
additional market strength after a position of dominance has already been 
acquired. 
If the use of the term "substantial" in this context means "more than trivial or 
nominal" then there is probably little difference between the two prohibitions. If 
the term "substantial" means "considerable" or "large" then the writer considers 
that the two prohibitions do have quite different coverage. The New Zealand 
section does not provide for a "safe harbour" of any type once the dominance 
threshold has been reached. 
(iii) The writer considers that the Commerce Act does not (despite the views of the 
Steering Committee of Officials on Harmonisation of Business Laws)114 permit 
examination by the New Zealand Commerce Commission of acquisitions that 
take place outside New Zealand. The only exception to this is where the party 
acquiring shares or assets if resident or carrying on business in New Zealand. 
The writer considers this is a shortcoming in the Commerce Act, the effect of 
which will, as commercial relationships between New Zealand and Australian 
companies increase and strengthen under CER, become increasing apparent. In 
the writer's view it is anomalous to protect the competitive integrity of New 
Zealand's markets to the extent they are harmed by New Zealand traders, but 
effectively ignore similar conduct when it originates offshore. The writer is of 
the view that the Commerce Act should be amended to incorporate provision 
(similar to those in section 50A of the Australian Act) in relation to the 
acquisition outside New Zealand of a controlling interest in any New Zealand 
company. 
A Trans-Tasman Merger Forum 
The possibility of an increasing number of acquisitions or mergers which have 
competitive consequences for markets in both Australia and New Zealand, raises the . 
issue of the necessity or desirability of introducing some type of joint forum for the 
consideration of such transactions. Clearly such a move to share control over business 
activities raises a number of issues of state sovereignty and would probably be rejected 
by some as a matter of principle. The subject of a trans-Tasman forum has been raised 
by some academics and members of the judiciary at a time which Australia has recently 
abolished its appeals to the Privy Council, the only court previously shares by with 
New Zealand, and New Zealand is itself questioning a continued Privy Council appeal 
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procedure.115 The issue has been raised in relation to other areas of the trade practice 
legislation apart from mergers as well as in relation to other areas of law affected by the 
CER Agreement such as tax law, customs regulation and company and securities laws. 
Short of federation between Australia and New Zealand, a number of possibilities exist 
for an interjurisdictional forum to resolve future trans-Tasman legal disputes. They 
include a regional Privy Council, using the High Court of Australia, a South Pacific 
Court of Appeal and a trans-Tasman Commercial Court. Space does not permit a full 
discussion of each of those options, however there is a growing volume of commentary 
on this topic.116 The writer is of the view that the most likely and readily palatable of 
those options is probably a trans-Tasman commercial court. This option does however 
raise a number of practical issues not the least of which are the current inability to 
exclude the constitutional prerogative review of the High Court of Australia of all 
Australian Courts and the probably invalidity of any attempt to create an appeal from 
any Australian Court to a body outside Australia. In light of these difficulties, one 
writer in this area considers that a trans-Tasman court would not be acceptable (and 
neither would any of the other options referred to).11 7 
The resolution of this issue will probably not seriously be addressed until there have 
been a number of significant commercial law cases which have arisen and been of a 
nature crying out for resolution in some type of joint forum. Until that occurs it is 
likely that the status quo will remain. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
1. The tans-Tasman application accorded to the market power prohibitions in New 
Zealand's Commerce Act 1986 and Australia's Trade Practices Act 1974 
constitute a significant step forward in the advancement of the objectives of the 
CER Agreement and the later Memorandum of Understanding on the 
Harmonisation of Business Law. While the new provisions have yet to be tested 
the writer maintains that the different market power thresholds prevailing in 
each country may give rise to discrepancies in the treatment of similar conduct 
depending in which country the conduct occurs. 
2. The scope of the reform is limited by the exclusion from section 36A of the 
Commerce Act and section 46A of the Australian Act of persons with a dominant 
position in a market exclusively for services. In addition, competition in a 
number of significant services industries is hindered by the exclusion of 
industries such as trans-Tasman shipping and air passenger services and 
Australian telecommunications, from the CER Protocol on Trade in Services. 
Real competition in these areas will require significant further domestic 
deregulation which will of course take some time, even if the terms of sections 
36A and 46A are extended to markets for services in the meantime. 
4. While Australia and New Zealand restrictive trade practice legislation is already 
drafted in broadly similar terms, a number of differences existed between them. 
These include: 
• the application of New Zealand's restrictive trade practice provisions to 
business acquisitions; 
• the limited scope of New Zealand's exclusionary provision section which, 
since July 1990, does not cover agreements between competitors not to 
supply or acquire from a third party, unless that third party (or an 
interconnected body corporate thereof) is in competition with one of the 
parties to the agreement; 
• the absence in Australia of restrictions on resale price maintenance where 
both the supplier and the purchaser/ retailer are non-corporate entities; 
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• the absence in Australia of any restrictions on third party resale price 
maintenance; 
• the inability to obtain authorisation for resale price maintenance in 
Australia; 
• the absence of express provision in New Zealand for secondary boycotts; 
• the limited coverage provided by the Commerce Act for acts of exclusive 
dealing which may not come within the ambit of section 27, such as 
certain refusals to supply and third line forcing. 
5. While some of the discrepancies between the restrictive trade practice coverage 
of the two sections will in practice be more significant than others, the writer is 
of the view that all of those sections should, as far as possible, be more closely 
aligned. While the aim of harmonisation of Australia and New Zealand business 
law does not necessarily require duplication of laws, the writer considers that in 
the context of trade practices regulation a large number of examples of 
unnecessary differences exist in drafting. Where the differences are matters of 
more substance it is imperative that the potential significance of those 
differences are understood by officials in both countries prior to any further 
reform. 
6. In the area of regulation of business acquisitions, broadly similar legal 
thresholds and procedures are in place in Australia and New Zealand. Some 
legislative differences do exist between the tests however. The most obvious of 
these are the fact that the merger provisions in Australia extend to parties 
already in a dominant position only if that position is "substantially 
strengthened" by the merger, and the requirement that dominance be increased 
in relation to a "substantial" market in Australia. The effect of these differences 
is not entirely clear but it is possible that they impose more stringent tests for 
contravention, leaving a larger number of mergers outside the scope of section 
50 of the Australian Act than would be the case in New Zealand. 
7. If the stated objectives of the CER Agreement and its subsequent protocols and 
understandings are to meet their full potential, as both Governments have 
repeatedly stated is their intention, the writer considers it essential that 
anti-competitive conduct in both countries be regulated in the same way. While 
acknowledging the existing similarities between the Commerce Act 1986 and the 
Trade Practices Act 197 4 and the growing volume of jurisprudence that 
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is being applied across borders, it would be unfortunate if, having achieved 
general harmonisation, the discrepancies discussed in this paper are ignored. 
While the writer has taken the view that, there are some legislative differences 
which in practice will not be significant, it would be sensible if these provisions 
are harmonised in their terms, so that unnecessary time and costs are not wasted 
in opinioning on the relevance of those differences, or lack thereof. 
8. Ultimately however, the fact remains that further harmonisation of Australia 
and New Zealand's trade practice laws will be constrained by considerations of 
sovereignty and desires by each country to follow different policy options. It 
may be that in any particular case, neither country will be prepared to amend its 
legislation to follow that which is in force in the other country. The writer hopes 
that the importance of closely aligned trade practice legislation will be 
recognised and legislative differences minimised. 
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APPENDIX1 
PART II - RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES 
Practices Substantially Lessening Competition 
SECTION 27 CONTRACTS, ARRANGEMENTS, OR UNDERSTANDINGS 
SUBSTANTIALLY LF..5SENING COMPETITION PROHIBITED 
27(1) (Entering Into prohibited) No person shall enter into a contract or 
arrangement, or arrive at an understanding, containing a provision that has the 
purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition 
in a market. 
27(2) [Giving err«t to prohibited) No person shall give effect to a provision of 
a contract, arrangement, _or understanding that has the purpose, or has or is likely 
to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition in a market. 
27(3) [Existing con.tracts) Subsection (2) of this section applies in respect of a 
contract or arrangell"ent entered into, or an understanding arrived at, whether before 
or after the commencement of this Act. 
27(4) (Unenforceable) No provision of a contract, whether made before or after 
the commencement of this Act, that has the purpose, or has or is likely to have the 
effect, of substantially lessening competition in a market is enforceable. 
SECTION 28 COVENANTS SUBSTANTIALLY LF..5SENING COMPETITION 
PROHIBITED 
28(1) (Covtnants prohibited] No person, either on his own or on behalf of an 
associated person, shall-
(a) Require the giving of a covenant; or 
(b) Give a covenant-
that has the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening 
competition in a market. 
28(2) (Terms unenforceable) No person, either on his own or on behalf of an 
associated person, shall carry out or enforce the terms of a covenant that has the 
purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition 
in a market. 
28(3) [Exisllng covenants) Subsection (2) of this' section applies to a covenant 
whether given before or after the commencement of this Act. 
28(4) [Covenant unenforceable) No cove·n~t. whether given before or after the 
commencement of this Act, that has the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect 
of substantially lessening competition in a market is enforceable. 
28(5) (Retributive conduct prohibited) No person shall-
(a) Threaten to engage in particular conduct if a person who, but for subsection 
(4) of this section, would be bound by a covenant, does not comply with 
the terms of the covenant; or 
(b) Engage in particular conduct because a person who, but for subsection (4) 
of this section, would be bound by a covenant, has failed to comply, or 
proposes or threatens to fail to comply, with the terms of the covenant. 
21(6) [Presumption) Where a person-;-
(a) Issues an invitation to another person to enter into a contract containing 
a covenant; or 
(b) Makes an offer. to another person to enter into a contract containing a 
covenant; or 
(c) Makes it known that the person will not enter into a contract of a particular 
kind unless the contract contains a covenant of a particular kind or in 
particular terms.-
that person shall, by issuing that invitation, making that offer, or making that fact 
known, be deemed to require the giving of the covenant. 
28(7) [Associated persons) For the purposes of this section, 2 persons shall be taken 
to be associated with each other in relation to a covenant or proposed covenant if, 
but only if,-
(a) One person is under an obligation (otherwise than in pursuance of the 
covenant or proposed covenant), whether formal or informal, to act in 
accordance with the directions, instructions, or wishes of the other person 
in relation to the covenant or proposed covenant; or 
(b) The persons are interconnected bodies corporate. 
SECTION 29 CONTRACTS, ARRANGEMENTS, OR UNDERSTANDINGS 
CONTAINING EXCLUSIONARY PROVISIONS PROHIBITED 
29(1) (Exclusionary provision defined) For the purposes of this Act, a provision 
of a contract, arrangement, or understanding is an exclusionary provision if-
(a) It is a provision of a contract or arrangement entered into, or understanding 
arrived at, between persons of whom any 2 or more are in competition with 
each other; and 
(b) It has the purpose of preventing, restricting, or limiting the supply of goods 
or services to, or the acquisition of goods or services from, any particular 
person or class of persons, either generally or in particular circumstances 
or on particular conditions, by all or any of the parties to the contract, 
arrangement, or understanding, or if a party is a body corporate, by a body 
corporate that is interconnected with that party; and 
(c) The particular person or the class of persons to which the provision relates 
is in competition with one or more of the panics to the contract. 
arrangement or understanding in relation to the supply or acquisition of 
those goods or services. 
29(2) (Competition) For the purposes of subsection (l)(a) of this section, a person 
is in competition with another person if that person or any interconnected body 
corporate is, or is likely to be, or, but for the relevant provision, would be or would 
be likely to be, in competition with the other person, or with an interconnected body 
corporate, in relation to the supply or acquisition of all or any of the goods or services 
to which that relevant provision relates. 
29(3) (Entering Into prohibited) No person shall enter into a contract, or 
arrangement, or arrive at an understanding, that contains an exclusionary provision. 
29(4) (Giving effect to prohibited) No person shall give effect to an exclusionary 
provision of a contract, arrangement, or understanding. 
29(5) (Existing contracts) Subsection (4) of this section applies to an exclusionary 
provision of a contract or arrangement made, or understanding arrived at, whether 
before or after the commencement of this Act. 
29(6) (Unenforceable) No exclusionary provision of a contract, whether made 
before or after the commencement of this Act, is enforceable. 
Price Fixing 
SECTION 30 CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF CONTRACTS, ETC, WITH 
RESPECT TO PRICES DEEMED TO SUBSTANTIALLY LESSEN 
COMPETITION 
30(1) (Price fixing c:onlrac:ts] Without limiting the generality of section 27 of this 
Act, a provision of a contract, arrangement, or undc:rstanding shall be deemed for 
the purposes of that section to have the purpose, or to have or to be likely to have 
the effect, of substantially lessening competition in a market if the provision has the 
purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect of fixing, controlling, or maintaining, 
or providing for the fixing, controlling, or maintaining, of the price for goods or 
services, or any discount, allowance, rebate, or credit in relation to goods or services, 
that are-
(a) Supplied or acquired by the parties to the contract, arrangement, or 
understanding, or by any of them, or by any bodies corporate that are 
interconnected with any of them, in competition with each other; or 
(b) Resupplied by persons to whom the goods are supplied by the parties to 
the contract, arrangement, or understanding, or by any of them, or by any 
bodies corporate that arc interconnected with any of them in competition 
with each other. 
30(2) (Competitive Supply] The reference in subsection (!)(a) of this section to 
the supply or acquisition of goods or services by persons in competition with each 
other includes a reference to the supply or acquisition of goods or services by persons 
who, but for a provision of any contract, arrangement, or understanding would be, 
or would be likely to be, in competition with each other in relation to the supply 
or acquisition of the goods or services. 
SECTION 31 JOINT VENTURE PRIONG EXEMPT FROM APPLICATION 
OF SECTION 30 
31(1) (Joint nnlure defintd) ' For the purposes of this section-
(a) Joint venture means an activity in tradc-
(i) Carried on by 2 or more persons, whether or not in partnership; or 
(ii) Carried on by a body corporate for the purpose of enabling 2 or more 
persons to carry on that activity jointly by means of their joint control, 
or by means of their ownership of shares in the capital, of that body 
corporate or an interconnected body corporate: 
(b) A reference to a contract or arrangment entered into, or an understanding 
arrived at for the purposes of a joint venture shall, in relation to a joint 
venture by way of an activity carried on by a body corporate in terms of 
paragraph (a)(ii) of this subsection, be read as including a reference to the 
memorandum and articles of association, rules, or other document that 
constitute or constitutes, or is or arc to constitute, that body corporate. 
31(2) (Exttptloos to prltt fixing prcsumptJoo) Nothing in section 30 of this Act 
applies to a provision of a contract or arrangement entered into, or an understanding 
arrived at for the purposes of a joint venture, to the extent that the provision relates 
10-
(a) The joint supply by the parties to the joint venture, or the supply by the 
parties to the joint venture in proportion to their respective interests in the 
joint venture, of goods jointly produced by those parties in pursuanc_c of 
the joint venture; or · 
(b) The joint supply by the· parties to the joint venture of services in pursuance 
of the joint venture, or the supply by the parties to the joint venture in 
proportion to their respective interests in the joint venture, of services in 
pursuance of, and made available as a result of, the joint venture; or 
(c) In the case 9f a joint venture carried on by a body corporate in terms of 
subsection (l)(a)(ii) of this section,-
(i) The supply by that body corporate of goods produced by it in pursuance 
of the joint venture; or 
(ii) The supply by that body corporate of services in pursuance of the joint 
venture, not being services supplied on behalf of the body corporate by 
a person who is the owner of shares in the capital of the body corporate, 
or a body corporate that is interconnected with such a person. 
SECTION 32 CERTAIN RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO PRICES FOR GOODS 
AND SERVICES EXEMPT FROM APPLICATION OF SECTION 30 
32 Nothing in section 30 of this Act applies to a provision of a contract, arrangement, 
or understanding, to the extent that the provision recommends or provides for the 
recommending of the price for, or a discount, allowance, rebate or credit in relation 
to goods or services where the parties to the contract, or arrangement, or 
understanding include not less than 50 persons (bodies corporate that are 
interconnected being counted as a single person) who supply or acquire, in trade, 
goods or services to which the p_rovision applies. 
SECTION 33 JOINT BUYING AND PROMOTION ARRANGEMENTS 
EXEMPT FROM APPLICATION OF SECTION 30 
33 Nothing in section 30 of this Act applies to a provision of a contract, arrangement, 
or understanding that-
(a) Relates to the price for goods or services to be collectively acquired, whether 
directly or indirectly, by parties to the contract, arrangement, or 
understanding; or 
(b) Provides for joint advertising of the price for the resupply of goods so 
acquired. 
SECTION 34 CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF COVENANTS WITH RESPECT TO 
PRICES DEEMED TO SUBSTANTIALLY LESSEN COMPETITION 
34(1) (Price fixing covenants) Without limiting the generality of section 28 of this 
Act, a covenant shall be deemed for the purposes of that section to have the purpose, 
or to have or to be likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition 
in a market if the covenant has the purpose or has or is likely to have the effect of 
fixing, controlling, or maintaining, or providing for the fixing, controlling or 
maintaining of the price for goods or services, or any discount, allowance, rebate, 
or credit in relation to goods or services, that arc-
(a) Supplied or acquired by the persons giving the covenant or the persons 
entitled to the benefit of the covenant, or by any of them, or by bodies 
corporate that arc interconnected with any of them, in competition with 
each other; or 
(b) Resupplied by persons to whom the goods arc supplied by the persons giving 
the covenant or the person, entitled to the benefit of the covenant, or by 
any of them, or by bodies corporate that arc interconnected with any of 
them, in competition with each other. 
34(2) (Compditive supply) The reference in subsection (l)(a) of this section to the 
supply or acquisition of goods or services by persons in competition with each other 
includes a reference to the supply or acquisition of goods or services by persons who, 
but for the covenant, would be in competition with each other in relation to the supply or acquisition of the goods or services. 
Practices Substantially Lessening Competition Conditional 
Upon Authorisation 
SECTION 35 CONTRACTS OR COVENANTS SUBJECT TO AUTHORISATION NOT PROHIBITED UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS 
35(1) (Contracts and covenants) Notwithstanding anything in this Act, but subject 
to subsection (3) of this scction,-
(a) A contract to which section 27 or section 29 of this Act applies may be 
cntCTed into if the requirements of subsection (2) of this section arc complied 
with: 
(b) A covenant to which scctioh 28 of this Act applies may be required to be 
given, or may be given, if the requirements of subsection (2) of this section 
arc complied with. 
35(2) [Conditional on authorisation) For the purposes of subsection (I) of this 
section, the requirements that must be met are-
(a) In the case of a contract to which section 27 or section 29 of this Act applies, 
that the contract shall be subject to a condition that the provision, or 
exclusionary provision, as the case may be, shall not come into force unless 
and until authorisation is granted to give effect to the provision, or 
exclusionary provision, and that application shall be made for that 
authorisation within 15 working days after the contract is entered into: 
(b) In the case of a covenant to which section 28 of this Act applies, that the 
covenant is subject to the condition that it shall not have effect unless and 
until authorisation is granted to give effect to it and that application shall 
be made for that authorisation within 15 working days after the covenant 
is made. 
35(3) {Implementation prohibited) Nothing in this section-
(a) Prevents the giving effect to a provision of a contract or an exclusionary 
provision, as the case may be, from constituting a contravention of section 
27 or section 29 of this Act, as the case may be: 
(b) Prevents the giving effect to a covenant from constituting a contravention 
of section 28 of this Act. 
Use of Dominant Position in a Market 
SECTION 36 USE OF DOMINANT POSITION IN A MARKET 
36(1) {Prohibited purpo~J No person who has a dominant position in a market 
shall use that position for the purpose of-
(a) Restricting the entry of any person into that or any other market; or 
(b) Preventing or deterring any person from engaging in competitive conduct 
in that or in any other market; or 
(c) Eliminating any person from that or any other market. 
36(2) {Intellectual property rights! For the purposes of this section, a person docs 
not use a dominant position in a market for any of the purposes specified in paragraphs (a) to (c) of subsection (I) of this section by reason only that that person seeks to enforce any statutory intellectual property right within the meaning of section 4S(2) of this Act in New Zealand. 
36(3) (Authorised practl~ uceptcd) Nothing in this section applies to any practice or conduct to which this Part of this Act applies which has been authorised pursuant to Part V of this Act. 
SECTION 36A USE OF DOMINANT POSITION IN TRANS-TASMAN MARKETS 
36A(l) {Prohibited purposes! No person who has-
(a) A dominant position in a market; or 
(b) A dominant position in a market in Australia; or 
(c) A dominant position in a market in New Zealand and Australia-
shall use that person's dominant position for the purpose of-
(d) Restricting the entry of any person into any market, not being a market 
exclusively for services; or 
(e) Preventing or deterring any person from engaging in competitive conduct 
in any market, not being a market exclusively for services; or 
(f) Eliminating any person from any market, not being a market exclusively 
for services. 
.J6A(2) (Jnlelleclual proputy rights} For the purposes of this secrion, a person does not use a dominant position in a market for any of the purposes specified in paragraphs (d) to (f) of subsection (I) of this section by reason only that that person seeks to enforce any statutory intellectual property right, within the meaning of section 4S(2) of this Act, in New Zealand. 
36A(3) (Authori~ practices excepted) Nothing in this section applies to any practice or conduct to which this Part of this Act applies that has been authorised pursuant to Part Y of this Act. 
Resale Price Maintenance 
SECTION 37 RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE BY SUPPLIERS PROHIBITED 
37(1) (ProhlbltJoa) No person shall engage in th_e practice of resale price maintenance. 
37(2) (PractJce of RPM] For the purposes of this section a person engages in the practice of resale price maintenance if that person (in this section referred to as the supplier) does any of the acts referred to in subsection (3) of this section. 
37(3) (RPM aru] The acts referred to for the purposes of subsection (2) of this section are-
(a) The supplier making it known to another person that the supplier will not supply goods to the other person unless the other person agrees not to sell those goods at a price less than a price specified by the supplier: 
(b) The supplier inducing, or attempting to induce, another person not to sell, at a price less than a price specified by the supplier, goods supplied to the other person by the supplier or by a third person who, directly or indirectly, has obtained the goods from the supplier: 
(c) The supplier entering or offering to enter into an agreement, for the supply of goods to another person, where one of the terms is or would be that the other person will not sell the goods at a price less than a price specified, or that would be specified, by the supplier: 
(d) The supplier withholding the supply of goods to another person for the reason that the other person-
(i) Has not agreed to the condition mentioned in paragraph (a) of this subsection; or 
(ii) Has sold, or is likely to sell, goods supplied to him by the supplier, or goods supplied to him by a third person who, directly or indirectly, has obtained the goods from the supplier, at a price less than a price specified by the supplier as the price below which the goods arc not to be sold: 
(c) The supplier withholding the supply of goods to another person for the reason that a third person who, directly or indirectly, has obtained, or wishes to obtain, goods from the other person-
(i) Has not agreed not to sell those goods at a price less than a price specified by the supplier; or 
(ii) Has sold or is likely to sell goods supplied or to be supplied to that third person, by the other person, at a price less than a price specified by the supplier as the price below which the goods arc not to be sold. 
37(4) (Price ~t) For the purposes of subsection (3) of this section,-
(a) Where the supplier makes it known, in respect of any goods, that the price below which those goods are not to be sold is a price specified by another person in respect of those goods, or in respect of goods of a like description, that price shall be deemed to have been specified, in respect of the first-mentioned goods, by the supplier: 
(b) Where a set form, method, or formula is specified by or on behalf of the supplier and a price may be ascertained by calculation from, or by reference to, that set form, method, or formula, that price shall be deemed to have been specified by the supplier: 
(c) Where the supplier makes it known, in respect of any goods, that the price below which those goods are not to be sold is a price ascertained by calculation from or by reference to a set form, method, or formula specified by another person in respect of those goods, or in respect of goods of a like description, that price shall be deemed to have been specified, in respect of the first-mentioned goods, by the supplier: 
(d) Where the supplier makes a statement to another person of a price that is likely to be understood by that person as the price below which goods arc not to be sold, that price shall be deemed to have been specified by the supplier as the price below which the goods are not to be sold: 
(c) Anything done by a person acting on behalf of, or by arrang~ment with, the supplier shall be deemed to have been done by the supplier. 
37(5) (Sale of defined) For the purposes of this section, "sale" includes advertise for sale, display for sale, and offer for sale, and "sell", "selling", and "sold" have corresponding meanings. 
SECTION 38 RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE BY OTHERS PROHIBITED 
33(1) (}Undcring supply] No person (in this section referred to as the "third party") shall-
(a) Make it known to another person that the third party proposes to engage in conduct, whether alone or in concert with any other person, that will hinder or prevent the supply of any goods to, or the acquisition of any goods from, that person unless that person agrees not to sell those goods at a price less than the price specified by the third party; or 
(b) Engage in conduct, whether alone or in concert with any other person, that will hinder or prevent the supply of goods to, or the acquisition of goods from, another person for the purpose of inducing that person not to sell those goods at a price less than a price specified by the third party. 
38(2) (Specified price} For the purposes of subsection (1) of this section,-
(a) Where the third party makes it known, in respect of any goods, that the price below which those goods arc not to be sold is a price specified by another person in respect of those goods, or in respect of goods of a like description, that price shall be deemed to have been specified in respect of the first-mentioned goods, by the third party: 
(b) Where a set form, method, or formula is specified by or on behalf of the third party and a price may be ascertained by calculation from, or by reference to, that set form, method, or formula, that price shall be deemed to have been specified by the third party: 
(c) "':here the thir~ party makes it known, in respect of any goods, that the 
price ~low which those goods arc not to ~ sold is a price ascertained by 
calculation from or ?Y reference to a set form, method, or formula specified 
~Y anoth~r ?Crson m r~spect of those goods, or in respect of goods of a 
hke descnptlon, t~at pnce shall be deemed to have been specified, in respect 
of the first-mentioned goods, by the third party: 
(d) ~~ere the third party makes a statement to another person of a price that 
1s likely to be understood by that person as the price below which goods 
are n~t to be sold, that ~rice shall be deemed to have been specified by 
the third party as the price below which the goods are not to be sold: 
(e) Anyth_ing done by a person acting on behalf of, or by arrangement with, 
the third party shall be deemed to have been done by the third party. 
38(3) [Sale defined) For the purposes of this section "sale" includes advertise for 
sale, display for sale, and offer for sale, and "sell", "selling", and "sold" have 
corresponding meanings. 
SECTION 39 k.ECOMMENDED PRICES 
39 For the purposes of section 37(3)(b) of this Act, a supplier of any goods is not 
to be taken as inducing, or attempting to induce, another person not to sell those 
goods at a price less than a price specified by the supplier "1Crcly bccausc-
(a) A statement of a price is applied or used in relation to the goods or is applied 
to a covering, label, reel, or thing if the statement is preceded by the words 
"recommended price"; or 
(b) The supplier has given notification in writing to the other person (not being 
a notification in the form of a statement applied to the goods or to any 
covering, label, reel, or thing as mentioned in paragraph (a) of this 
subsection) of the price that the supplier recommends as appropriate for 
the sale of those goods, if the notification, and each writing that refers, 
whether expressly or by implication, to the notification, includes a statement 
to the effect that the price is a recommended price only and there is no 
obligation to comply with the recommendation. 
SECTION 40 WITHHOLDING THE SUPPLY OF GOODS 
40 For the purposes of section 37(3)(d) and (c) of this Act, the supplier shall be 
deemed to withhold the supply of goods to another if-
(a) The supplier refuses or fails to supply those goods to, or as requested by, 
the other person; or 
(b) The supplier refuses to supply those goods except on terms that are 
disadvantageous to the other person; or 
(c) In supplying those goods to the other person, the supplier treats that person 
less favourably, whether in respect of time, method, or place of delivery, 
or otherwise, than the supplier treats other persons to whom the supplier 
supplies the same or similar goods; or 
(d) The supplier causes or procures a person to act in relation to the supply 
of goods in the manner specified in paragraphs (a), (b), or (c) as the case 
may be, of this section. 
SECTION 41 PREVENTING THE SUPPLY OF GOODS 
41 For the purposes of section 38 of this Act,- . 
(a) The supply of goods shall be deemed to be prevented if-
(i) The supply of those goods is refused except on terms that arc 
disadvantageous to the person acquiring the goods; or 
(ii) The supply of those goods is on terms which arc less favourable, whether 
in respect of time, method, or place of delivery, or otherwise, than the 
person who supplies the goods treats other persons to whom the same 
or similar goods are supplied: 
(b) The acquisition of goods shall be deemed to be prevented if-
(i) The acquisition of those goods is refused except on terms that are 
disadvantageous to the person supplying the goods; or 
(ii) The acquisition of those goods is on terms which are less favourable, 
whether in respect of time, method, or place of delivery, or otherwise, 
than the person who acquires the goods treats other persons from whom 
the same or similar goods arc acquired. 
SECTION 42 SPECIAL EVIDENTIARY PROVISIONS IN RESPECT OF 
CERTAIN RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE PRACTICES 
42(1) [Withholding supply) Where, in proceedings under this Act against a supplier 
for a contravention of section 37(3)(d) or section 37(3)(e) of this Act it is proved that-
(a) The supplier has acted in a manner referred to in section 40 of this Act; and 
(b) During a period ending immediately before the supplier so acted, the supplier 
had been supplying goods of the kind withheld either to-
(i) The person in respect of whom the contravention is alleged; or 
(ii) A person carrying on a similar business to that person; and 
(c) During a period of 6 months immediately before the supplier so acted, the 
supplier became aware of a matter or circumstance capable of constituting 
a reason referred to in section 37(3)(d) or (e) of this Act-
it shall be presumed, in the absenc~ of evidence to the contrary, that the supplier 
so acted on account of that matter. 
42(2) [Exception) Nothing in subsection (I) of this section applies in respect of 
terms imposed by a supplier that arc disadvantageous or treatment that is less 
favourable than the supplier accords other persons if the terms or treatment consists 
only of a requirement by the supplier as to the time at which, or the form in which, 
payment was to be made or as to the giving of security to secure payment. 
SECTION 43 STATUTORY EXCEPTIONS 
43(1) [Speclfkally authorised) Nothing in this Part of this Act applies in respect 
of any act, matter, or thing that is, or is of a kind, specifically authorised by any 
enactment or Order in Council made under any Act. 
43(2) [Gener:ll terms insuffici,nt) For the purposes of subsection (I) of this section, 
an enactment or Order in Council does not provide specific authority for an act, 
matter, or thing if it provides in general terms for that act, matter, or thing, 
notwithstanding that the act, matter, or thing requires or may be subject to approval 
or authorisation by a Minister of the Crown, statutory body or a person holding any 
particular office, or, in the case of a rule made or an act, matter, or thing done 
pursuant to any enactment, approval or authorisation by Order in Council. 
43(3) (Exceptions to authorisations) No act, matter. or thing authorised under 
section 7(2)(i) of the Sharc:brokers Amendment Act 1981 or section 70( I )(n) of the 
Real Estate Agents Act 1976 as enacted immediately before the commencement of 
this Act, shall be taken to be specifically authorised under subsection (I) of this section. 
APPENDIX2 
PART III - BUSINESS ACQUISITIONS 
SECTION 47 CERTAIN ACQUISITIONS PROHIBITED 
47(1) (Do mi nan I position) No person shall acquire ru;sets of a business or shares 
if, as a result of the acquisi~ion,- · 
(a) Thal person or another person would be, or would be likely to be, in a 
dominant position in a market; or 
(b) That person's or another person's dominant position in a market would 
be, or would be likely to be, strengthened. · 
47(2) [lnlerconnecled, assocla{ed persons) For the purposes of this section and 
section 48 of this Act, where 2 or more persons a·re inlerconnected or associated and 
toge1her arc in a dominant position in a market, each of them is deemed to be in 
a dominant position in that market.. , · : . · . 
47(3)' ("Associated") For tfie purposes of 1his section and section 48 of this Act, 
a person is associa.led with another person if that person is able, whether directly 
or indirectly, to exert a substantial degree of inOuence over the activi1ies of the other. 
47(4) (No substantial lnfluencr) A person is not able to exert a substantial degree 
of inOuencc over th~ activities of another person for the purposes of subsection (3) 
of this section, by .reason only of the fact that-
(a) . Those persons arc in competition in the same market; or 
. · (b) One or thcin supplies goods or services tci the other. 
SECTION 48 BARE TRANSFER OF MARKET D0M1NANCE EXCLUDED 
48 . Nothing in section 47 of this Act applies to the acquisition of assets of a business 
or shares ir-
(a) Before the acquisition cither-
(i) The pe~on acquiring the assets or shares; or 
(ii) The business the assets or which arc acquired or the body corporate in 
which the shares arc acquired, as the case may be,-
already had a dominant position in a market; and 
(b) The acquisition has not resulted or will not result in the strengthening of 
that dominant position. 
APPENDIX3 
PART IV - RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES 
st:CTION 45 CONTRACTS, ARRANGEMENTS OR UNDERSTANDINGS 
RESTRICTING DEALINGS OR AFFECTING COMPETITION 
4SO) (Cerlaln pro,·lslons made before 1977 amtndmtnt prohiblled) Ir • 
provision of a contract made before the commencement of the Trade Practices 
Amendment Act 1977-
(a) is an exclusionary provision; or 
(b) has the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of substantially 
lessening competition, 
that provision is unenforceable in so far as it confers rights or benefits or imposes 
duties or obligations on a corporation. 
4S(l) (Prohibited conduct) A corporation shall not-
(•) make a contract or arrangement, or arrive at an understanding, if-
(i) the proposed contract, arrangement or understanding contains an 
exclusionary provision; ?r 
(ii) a provision of the proposed contract, arrangement or understanding 
has the purpose, or would have or be likely to have the effect, of 
substantially lessening competition; or 
(b) give effect 10 a provision of a contract, arrangement or understanding, 
whether the contrat:t or arrangement was made, or the understanding was 
arrived at, before or after the commencement of this section, if that 
provision-
(i) is an exclusionary provision; or 
(ii) has the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of substantially 
lessening competition. 
4S(3) ("Competition": Jtt. 45, 45AJ For the purposes of this section and section 
4SA, "competition", in relation to a provision of a contract, arrangement or 
understanding or of a proposed contract, arrangement or understanding, means 
competition in any market in which a corporation that is a party to the contract, 
arrangement or understanding or would be a party to the proposed contract, 
arrangement or understanding, or any body corporate related to such a corporation, 
supplies or acquires, or is likely to supply or acquire, goods or services or would, but 
for the provision, supply or acquire, or be likely to supply or acquire, goods or 
services. 
45(4) (Provision de,mtd lo substantially lessen competition) For the purposes of 
the application of this section in relation to a particular corporation, a provision of a 
contract, arrangement or understanding or of a proposed contract, arrangement or 
understanding shall be deemed to have or to be likely to have the effect of 
substantially lessening competition if that provision and any one or more of the 
following provisions, namely-
(a) the other provisions of that contract, arrangement or understanding or 
proposed contract, arrangement or understanding; and 
(b) the provisions of any other contract, arrangement or understandin& or 
proposed contract, arrangement or understandin& to which the 
corporation or a body corporate related to the corporation is or would be 
a party, 
together have or arc likely to have that effect. 
45(5) (Stcllon not to apply) This section docs not apply to or in relation to-
(a) a provision of a contract where the provision constitutes a covenant to 
which section 4SB applies or, but for sub·section 458(9), would apply; 
(b) a provision of a proposed contract where the provision would constitute a 
covenant to which section 4SB would apply or. but for sub-section 4SB(9), 
would apply; or . . 
(c) a provision of a contract, arrangement or understanding or of_~ proposed 
contract, arrangement or understanding in so far as the prov151on r~lat~s 
10 conduct that contravenes section 48 or would contravene that section 1f 
this Act defined the acts constituting the practice of resale price 
maintenance by reference to the maximum price at which goods arc to be 
sold or are to be advertised, displayed or offered for sale. 
45(6) [ErTect or authorization, notification) The making of a contract, arrangement 
or understanding docs not constitute a contravention of this section by reason that the 
contract, arrangement or understanding contains a provision the giving effect t~ which 
would, or would but for the operation of sub-section 47(10) or SS(S) or_ secllo~ 93, 
constitute a contravention of section 47 and this section docs not apply to or tn relation to 
the giving effect to a provision of a contract, arrangement or understanding by way of-
(1) engaging in conduct that contravenes, or would bur for the operation of 
sub-section 47(10) or 88(8) or section 93 contravene, section 47; or 
(b) doing an act by reason of a breach or threatened breach of a condition 
referred to in sub-section 47(2), (4), (6) or (8), being an act done by a 
person at a time when-
(i) an authorization under sub-section 88(8) is in force in relation to 
conduct engaged in by that person on that condition; or 
(ii) by reason of sub-section 93(7) conduct engaged in by that person on 
that condition is not to be taken to have the effect of substantially 
lessening competition within the meaning of section 4 7. 
45(7) (No appllcallon to agrtem,nls ror acquisition of shares) This section docs 
not apply to or in relation to a contract, arrangement or undersranding in so far as 
the contract, arrangement or understanding provides, or to or in relation to a 
proposed contract, arrangement or understanding in so far as the proposed 
contract, arrangement or understanding would provide, directly or indirectly for the 
acquisition of any shares in the capital, or any assets, of a body corporate. 
45(8) !No application to agrnments btlwcen related bodies corporate) This 
section docs not apply to or in relation to a contract, arrangement or understanding, 
or a proposed contract, arrangement or understanding, the only parties to which arc 
or would be bodies corporate that are related to each other . 
45(9) (Sub·sectlon (2) not to apply to certain provisions) The making by a 
corporation of a contract that contains a provision in relation to which sub·scction 
88(1) applies is not a contravention of sub-section (2) of this section if-
(a) the contract is subject to a condition that the provision will not come into 
force unless and until the corporation is granted an authorization 10 give 
effect to the provision; and 
(b) the corporation applies for the grant of such an authorization within 14 
days after the contract is made, 
but nothing in this sub-section prevents the giving effect by a corporation to such a 
provision from constituting a contravention of sub-section (2). 
st:CTlON 45A CONTRACTS, ARRANGEMENTS OR 
UNDERSTANDINGS IN RELATION TO PRICES 
4SA(l) (Price fixing agreements deemed to contravene stt. 45) Without limiting 
the generality of section 4S, a provision of a contract, arrangement or 
understanding, or of a proposed contract, arrangoment or understanding, shall be 
deemed for the purposes of that section to have the purpose, or 10 have or to be 
likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition if the provision has 
the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, as the case may be, of fixing, 
controlling or maintaining, or providing for the fixing, controlling or maintaining 
of, the price for, or a discount, allowance, rebate or credit in relation to, goods or 
services supplied or acquired or to be supplied or acquired by the parties to the 
contract, arrangement or understanding or the proposed parties to the proposed 
contract, arrangement or understanding, or by any of them, or by any bodies 
corporate that arc related to any of them, in competition with each other. 
4SA(l) (Sub-section (J) not to apply to certain agreements for the purposes of Joint 
nnturcs) Sub-section (I) docs no\ apply to a provision of a contract or 
arrangement made or of an understanding arrived at, or of a proposed contract or 
arrangement to be made or of a proposed understanding to be arrived at, for the 
purposes of a joint venture to the extent that the provision relates or would relate 
to-
(a) the joint supply by the parties to the joint venture, or the supply by the 
parties to the joint venture in proportion to their respective interests in the 
joint venture, of goods jointly produced by those parties in pursuance of 
the joint venture; 
(b) the joint supply by the parties to the joint venture of services in pursuance 
of the joint venture, or the supply by the parties to the joint venture in 
proportion to their respective interests in the joint venture of services in 
pursuance of, and made available as a result of, the joint venture; or 
(c) in the case of a joint venture carried on by a body corporate as mentioned 
In sub-paragraph <CJ(a)(li)-
(i) the supply by that body corporate of goods produced by it in pursuance 
of the joint venture; or . 
(ii) the supply by that body corporate of services in pursuance of the joint 
vcnlure, not being 54:rviccs ~upplicd on behalf of the body corporate 
by-
(A) a person who is lhe owner of shares in 1hc capital of the body 
corporate; or 
(B) a body corporate that is related to such a person. 
4SA(3) (Sub-section (1) not to apply to certain price fhing agreements with more 
than 50 participants) Sub-section (I) docs not apply in relation to a provision of a 
contract, arrangement or understanding, or of a proposed contract, arrangement or 
understanding, to the extent that the provision recommends or provides for 
recommending. or would recommend or provide for recommending, the price for, 
or a discount, allowance. rebate or credit in relation to, goods or services, where the 
parties to the contract, arrangement or understanding, or the proposed parties to the 
proposed contract, arrangement or understanding, includc-
(a) not less than SO persons (bodies corporate that arc related to one another 
being counted as a single person) who supply, in trade or commerce, goods 
or services to which the provision applies; or 
(b) not less than SO persons (bodies corporate that arc related to one another 
being counted as a single person) who acquire, in trade or commerce, 
goods or services to which lhc provision applies. 
45A(4) (Sub-section (I) not to apply t(? certain •&rtcments on prlc~ of goods 
collectlnly acquired) Sub-section (I) docs not apply to a provision of a conlract, 
arrangement or understanding, or of a proposed contract, arrangement or 
understanding, being a provision-
(a) in relation to the price for goods or services to be collectively acquired, 
whether directly or indirectly, by parties to the contract, arrangement or 
understanding or by proposed parties to the proposed contract, 
arrangement or understanding; or 
(b) for the joint advertising of the price for the re-supply of goods so 
acquired. 
4SA(S) (Form of agreement not conclusive! For the purposes of this Act, a 
provision of a contract, arrangement or understanding, or of a proposed conlract, 
arrangement or understanding, shall not be taken not to have the purpose, or not to 
have or to be likely to have the effect, of fixing, controlling or maintaining, or 
providing for the fixing, controlling or maintaining of, lhc price for, or a discount, 
allowance, rebate or credit in relation to, goods or services by reason only of-
(a) the form of, or of that provision of, the contract, arrangement or 
underslanding or the proposed contract, arrangement or understanding; 
or 
(b) any description given to, or to that provision of, the contract, 
arrangemen~_or underslanding or the proposed contract, arrangement or 
understanding by lhc parties or proposed parties. 
<45A(6) [Ccrlaln •&rccments not to be deemed to hne prohibited purpose) For 
the purposes of this Act but withoul limiling the generality of sub-section (S), a 
provision of a contract, arrangement or understanding, or of a proposed conlract, 
arrangement or understanding, shall not be taken nol to have the purpose, or not to 
have or to be likely to have the effect, of fixing, controlling or maintaining, or 
providing for the fixing, controlling or maintaining of, the price for, or a discount, 
allowance, rebate or credit in relation to, goods or services by reason only that the 
provision recommends, or provides for the recommending of, such a price, 
discount, allowance, rebate or credit if in fact the provision has that purpose or has 
or is likely to have that effect. 
4SA(7) !Certain agreements deemed to have prohibited purpoS:J For the 
purposes of the preceding provisions of this section but without" limiting the 
generality _of those provisions, a provision of a contract, arrangement or 
understanding, or of a proposed contract, arrangement or understanding, shall be 
d(Cmed to have the purpose, or to have or to be likely to have the effect, of fixing, 
controlling or maintaining, or providing for the fixing, controlling or maintaining 
of, the price for, or a discount, allowance, rebate or credit in relation to, goods 
supplied as mentioned in sub-section (I) if the provision has the purpose, or has or is 
likely to have the effect, of fixing, controlling or maintaining, or providing for the 
fixing, controlling or maintaining of, such a price, discount, allowance, rebate or 
credit in relation to a re-supply of the goods by persons 10 whom the goods arc or 
would be supplied by the parties to the contract, arrangement or understanding or 
the proposed parties to the proposed contract, arrangement or understanding, or by 
any of them, or by any bodies corporate that are related to any of them. 
4SA(II) !"Supply or acquisition by persons In competition") The: reference in 
sub-section (I) to the supply or acquisition of goods or services by persons in 
competition with each other includes a reference to the supply or acquisition of 
ioods or services by persons who, but for a provision of any contract, arrangement 
or understanding or of any proposed contract, arrangement or understanding, 
would be, or would be likely to be, in competition with each other in relation to the 
supply or acquisition of the goods or services. 
SECTION 458 COVENANTS AFFECTING COMPETITION 
458(1) !Certain covenants unenforceable) A covenant, whether the covenant was 
given before or after the commencement of this section, is unenforceable in so far as 
it confers rights or benefits or imposes duties or obligations on a corporation or on a 
person associated with a corporation if the covenant has, or is likely to have, the 
effect of substantially lessening competition in any market in which the corporation 
or any person associated with the corporation supplies or acquires, or is likely to 
supply or acquire, goods or services or would, but for the covenant, supply or 
acquire, or be likely to supply or acquire, goods or services. 
458(2) !Prohibited conduct) A corporation or a person associated with a 
corporation shall not-
(a) require the giving of a covenant, or give a covenant, if the proposed 
covenant has the purpose, or would have or be likely to have the effect, of 
substantially lessening competition in any marker in which-
(i) the corporation, or any person associated with the corporation by 
virtue of paragraph (7)(b), supplies or acquires, is likely 10 supply or 
acquire, or would, bur for the covenant, supply or acquire, or be likely 
to supply or acquire, goods or services; or 
(ii) any person associated with the corporation by virtue of the operation of 
paragraph (7)(a) supplies or acquires, is likely to supply or acquire, or 
would, but for the covenant, supply or acquire, or be likely to supply or 
acquire, goods or services, being a supply or acquisition in relation to 
which that person is, or would be, under an obligation to act in 
accordance: with directions, instructions or wishes of the: corporation; 
(b) threaten to engage in particular conduct if a person who, but for sub-
sect ion (I), would be: bound by a covenant does not comply with the terms 
of the covenant; or 
(c) engage in particular conduct by reason that a person who, but for sub-
section (I), would be bound by a covenant has failed to comply, or 
proposes or threatens to fail to comply, with the terms of the covenant. 
45B(3) !When person deemed lo require elvln& of covenant) Where a person-
(a) issues an invitation 10 another person to enter into a contract containing a 
covenant; 
(b) makes an offer to another person to enter into a contract containing a . . covenant; or 
(c) makes it known that 1he person will not enter into a contract of a 
particular kind unless the contract contains a covenant of a particular kind 
or in particular terms, 
the first-mentioned person shall, by issuing that invitation, making that offer or 
making that fact known, be deemed to require the giving of the covenant. 
458(4) [Connant deemed to have anti-competitive trfcct) For the purposes of 
this section, a covenant or proposed covenant shall be deemed to have, or to be 
likely to have, the effect of substantially lessening competition in a market if the 
covenant or proposed covenant, as the case may be, would have, or be likely to 
have, that effect when taken together with the effect or likely effect on competition 
in that market of any other covenant or proposed covenant to the benefit of which-
(a) a corporation that, or person who, is or would be, or but for sub-section 
(I) would be, entitled 10 the benefit of the first-mentioned covenant or 
proposed covenant; or 
(b) a person associated with the corporation referred to in paragraph (a) or a 
corporation associated with the person referred to in that paragaph, 
is or would be, or but for sub-section (I) would be, entitled. 
458(5) !Certain covenants do not contravene stt. 458) The requiring of the 
giving of, or the giving of, a covenant does not constitute a contravention of this 
section by reason that giving effect to the covenant would, or would but for the 
operation of sub-section 88(8) or section 93, constitute a contravention of section 47 
and this section does not apply to or in relation to engaging in conduct in relation to 
a covenant by way of-
(a) conduct that contravenes, or would but for the operation of sub-section 
88(8) or section 93 contravene, section 47; or 
(b) doing an act by reason of a breach or threatened breach of a condition 
referred to in sub-section '7(2), (4), (6) or (8), being an act done by a 
person at a time when-
(i) an authorization under sub-section 88(8) ls In fon:e lo. relation to 
conduct engaged in by that person on that condition; or 
(ii) by reason or sub-section 93(7) conduct engaged In by that· person on 
that condition is not to be taken to have the effect or substantially 
lessening competition within the meaning of section 47. 
4SB(6) (Sec. 4SB not to apply lo c:onnants binding related bodies corporate} This 
section does not apply to or in relation 10 a covenant or proposed covenant where 
the only persons who are or would be respectively bound by, or enti~ed to 1.he 
benefit or, the covenant or proposed covenant arc persons who are associated wuh 
each other or arc bodies corporate that arc related to each other. 
4SB(7) (Deemed association In covenant) For the purposes or this section, 
section 45C and sub-paragraph 87(3)(a)(ii), a person and a corporation. shall be 
taken to be associated with each other in relation to a covenant or proposed 
covenant if, and only if-
(a) the person is under an obligation (otherwise than in pursuance of the 
covenant or proposed covenant), whether formal or informal, to act in 
accordance with directions. instructions or wishes or the corporation in 
relation to the covenant or proposed covenant; or 
(b) the person is a body corporate in relation to which the corporation is in the 
position mentioned in sub-paragraph 4A(l)(a)(ii). 
458(8) (Certain covenants not 10 contravene sub-sf'Cllon (2)) The requiring by a 
person of the giving or, or the giving by a person or, a covenant in relation to which 
sub-section 88(S) applies is not a contravention or sub-section (2) or this section if-
(a) the covenant is subject to a condition that the covenant will not come Into 
force unless and until the person is granted an authorization to require the 
giving or, or to give, the covenant; and 
(b) the person applies for the grant of such an authorization within 14 days 
after the covenant is given, 
but nothing in this sub-section affects the application of paragraph (2}(b) or (c) In 
relation to the covenant. 
4SB(9) (Sec. 458 not to apply to certain covenants) This section docs not apply to 
or in rc:lation to a covenant or proposed covenant if-
(a) the sole or principal purpose for which the covenant was or is required to 
be given was or is 10 prevent the relevant land from being used otherwise 
than for residential purposes; 
(b) the person who required or requires the covenant to be given was or is a 
religious, charitable or public benevolent institution or a trustee for such 
an institution and the covenant was or is required to be given for or in 
accordance with the purposes or objects or that institution; or 
(c) the covenant was or is required to be given in pursuance or a legally 
enforceable requirement made by, or by a trustee for, a religious, 
charitable or public benevolent institution, being a r_cqu_irc~ent made for 
or in accordance with the purposes or objects of that msutuuon. 
st:CTION 45C COVENANTS IN RELATION TO PRICES 
45C(l) (Appllc:atlon of sec. 458(1)) In the application of sub-section 4~8(1) in 
relation to a covenant that has, or is likely to have, the effect of fixing, controlling 
or maintaining, or providing for the fixing, controlling or maintaining of, the price 
for, or a discount, allowance, rebate or credit in relation to, goods or services 
supplied or acquired by the persons who arc, or but for that sub-section would be, 
bound by or entitled 10 the benefit of the covenant, or by any of them, or by any 
persons associated with any of them, in competition with each other, that sub-
section has effect as if the words "if the covenant has, or is likely 10 have, the effect 
of substantially lessening competition in any market in which the corporation or any 
person associated with the corporation supplies or acquires, or is likely to supply or 
acquire, goods or services or would, but for the covenant, supply or acquire, or be likely 
10 supply or acquire, goods or services" were omined. 
45C(2) (Application of sec. 458(2)) In the application of sub-section 458(2) in 
relation to a proposed covenant that has the purpose, or would have or be likely to 
have the effect, of fixing, controlling or maintaining, or providing for the fixing, 
controlling or maintaining of, the price for, or a discount, allowance, rebate or 
credil in relation to, goods or services supplied or acquired by the persons who 
would, or would but for sub-section ~5B(I), be bound by or entitled to the benefit of 
the proposed covenant, or by any of them, or by any persons associated with any of 
them, in competition with each orhcr, paragraph 458(2)(a) has effect as if all the 
words after the words "require the giving of a covenant, or give a covenant" were 
omitted. 
4SC(3) (Certain covenants not to be taJ..cn as non-price fixing) For the purposes 
of this Act, a covenant shall not be taken not to have, or not to be likely to have, the 
dfect, or a proposed covenant shall not be taken not 10 have the purpose, or not to 
have, or not to be likc:ly to have, the effect, of fixing, controlling or maintaining, or 
providing for the fixing, controlling or maintaining of, the price for, or a discount, 
allowance, rebate or credit in relation to, goods or services by reason only or-
(a) the fonn of the covenant or proposed covenant; or 
(b) any dc~cription given to the covenant by an~ oft he persons who arc, or but for 
sub-section 458(1) would be, bound by orent1tlcd to the benefit of the covenant 
or any description given to the proposed covenant by any of the persons who 
would, or would but for sub-section 458(1), be bound by or entitled to the 
benefit of the proposed covenant. 
4SC(4) (Certain covenants deemed to have effect or purpo~ of price flxln&] For 
the purposes of the preceding provisions or this section, but without limiting the 
generality of those provisions-
(•) a covc?ant shall be deemed to have, or to be likely to have, the effect offixing, 
co~trol,li~g or mainta!ning, or providing for the fixing, controlling or 
maintaining of, the price for, or a discount, allowance rebate or credit in 
rcl~ti?n to, goods supplied as mentioned in sub-section (1) if the covenant has, 
or IS likcly_to have, the effect of fixing, controlling or maintaining, or providin1 
for the fixing. controlling or maintaining of, such a price, discount, allowance, 
rebate or credit in relation to a re-supply of the goods by persons to whom the 
goods are supplied by the persons who are, or but for sub-section 4SB( 1) would 
be, bound by or entitled to the benefit of the covenant, or by any of them, orby 
any persons associated with any of them; and 
(b) a proposed covenant shall be deemed to ~ave the p~r~~· orto have! ~r to be 
likely to have, the effect, of fixing, controlling ~r maintatn1~g, or proVldtng for 
the fixing, controlling or maintaining of, t~ pnce for,.or a d1.scount, all?wan~, 
rebate or credit in relation to, goods supplied as mentioned in sub-section (2) 1f 
the proposed covenant has the purpose, or.would h~vc ~r ~ lilcely to ~ve the 
effect, as the case may be, ofCixing. controlling or matntatn1~g, or providing for 
the fixing. controlling or maintaining of, such a price, discount, allowance, 
rebate or credit in relation to a re-supply of the goods by persons to whom ~he 
goods are supplied by the persons who would, or would but for sub-section 
4SB(I), be bound by or eotitled to the benefit_ of the proposed covenant, or by 
any of them, or by any persons associated with any of them. 
45C(5) (Reference to supply or acquisition or ioods or scnilces In subsec. (1)) 
The rdcrcnce in sub-section (I) to the supply or acquisition or goods or services by 
persons in competition with each other includes a reference to the supply or 
acquisition or goods or services by persons who, but for a provision or any contract, 
arrangement or understanding or or any proposed contract, arrangement or 
understanding, would be, or would be li\cely to be, in competition with each other in 
relation to the supply or acquisition or the goods or services. 
SECTION 450 BOYCOTIS 
45D(1) (Persons not to eniaic In conduct hlnderln& supply or acquisition by third 
person) Subject to this section, a person shall not, in concert with a second person, 
engage in conduct that hinders or prevents the supply of goods or services by a third 
person to a fourth person (not being an employer of the first-mentioned person) or 
the acquisition of goods or services by a third person from a fourth person (not 
bein& an employer of the first-mentioned person), wherc-
(a) the third person is, and the fourth person is not, a corporation and-
(i) the conduct would have or be likely to have the cffcct of causin&-
(A) substantial loss or damage to the business of the third person or of a 
body corporate that ls related to that person; or 
(8) a substantial lessening of competition In any market in which the third 
person or a body corporate that is related to that person supplies or 
acquires goods or services; and 
(II) the conduct Is engaged In for the purpose, and would have or be likely to 
have the dfect, of causing-
(A) substantial loss or damage to the business or the fourth person; or 
(8) a substantial lcssenin& of competition In any market in which the 
fourth person acquires goods or services; or 
(b) the fourth person is a corporation and the conduct is engaged in for the 
purpose, and would have or be likely to have the effect, of causin&-
(i) substantial loss or damage to the business of the fourth person or of a 
body corporate that is rcla1cd to that person; or 
(ii) a substantial lessening of competition in any market in which the fourth 
person or a body corporate that Is related to that person supplies or 
acquires goods or services. 
45D(1A) (Persons not to ,ngag, In conduct prenntlng third p,rson_from ,nia&i_ng 
In trade or commerce) Subject to this section, a person shall not, m concert with 
another person, engage in conduct for the purpose, and having or likely to h~vc the 
errcct, or preventing or substantially hindering a third person (not bemg an 
employer of the rirst-mentioned person) from engaging in trade or commcrce--
(a) between Australia and places outside Australia; 
(b) among the States; or 
(c) within a Territory, between a State and a Territory or between two 
Territories. 
45D(1B) (D,rences to sul>sK. (IA) contranntlon) In a proceeding under this Act 
in relation 10 a contravention or sub-section (IA), it is a defence if the defrndant 
provcs-
(a) that the conduct concerned is the subject of an authorization in force under 
section 88; 
(b) that a notice in respect of the conduct has been duly given to the 
Commission under sub-section 93(1) and the Commission has not given a 
notice in respect or the conduct under sub-section 93(3); or 
(c) that the dominant purpose for which the defendant engaged in the conduct 
concerned was 10 preserve or further a business carried on by him. 
45D(]C) (Appllcarlon of subs«. (JA) 10 one person not ar1,cted by olh'f pfTson 
provln& dcr,nc,) The application of sub-section (I A) in relation to a person in 
respect of his engaging in conduct in concert with another person is not affected by 
reason that the other person proves any of the matters mentioned in sub-secrion (I B) 
in respect or that conduct. 
450(2) (Para. 4F(b) not to apply to subsec. (1) or (IA)) Paragraph 4F(b) docs 
not apply in relation to sub-section (I) or (IA) or this section but a person shall be 
deemed to engage in conduct for a purpose mentioned in that sub-scction ir he 
engages In that conduct for purpose~ that include that purpose. 
45D(3) [D,f,ncc or legitimate inous1r1a1 action) 11. person shall not be taken to 
contravene, or to be involved in a contravention of, sub-section (I) or (IA) by engaging in 
conduct where-
(a) the dominant purpose for which the conduct is engaged in is substantially 
related to-
(i) the remuneration, conditions of employment, hours of work or working 
conditions of that person or of another person employed by an employer of 
that person; or 
(ii) an employer of that person having terminated, or taken action to terminate, 
the employment of rhat person or of another person employed by that 
employer; or 
(b) in the case of conduct engaged in by the following persons in concert with each 
other (and not in concert with any other person), that is 10 say-
(i) an organization or organizations of employees, or an officer or officers o( 
such an organiution, or both such an organization or orsaniutiona and 
such an officer or officers; and 
(ii) an employee, or two or more employees who arc employed by the one 
employer, 
the dominant purpose for which the conduct is engaged in is substantially 
related to-
(iii) the remuneration, conditions or employment, hours or work or working 
conditions or the employee, or of any or the employees, referred to in sub-
paragraph (ii); or 
{iv) the employer or the employee, or of the employees, referred to in sub-
paragraph {ii) having terminated, or taken action to tenninate, the 
employment or any of his employees. 
4SD(4) (Subs«. (1) or (IA) still to apply to other person If subsec. (3) prttludes 
one person from contravenllonJ The application of sub-section (I) or (IA) in 
relation 10 a person in respect of his engaging in conduce in concert with another 
person is not affccced by reason that sub-section (3) operates to preclude the other 
person from being taken to contravene, or to be involved in a contravention of, sub-
seccion (I) or (I A) in respect of that conduct. 
4SD(S) (When organization to be deemed to engage In conduct In concert "'·Ith 
"parllclpants"J If two or more persons (in this sub-secclon referred to as the 
"'participants") each of whom is a member or officer of the same organization or 
employees (being an organizacion that exists or is carried on for the purpose, or for 
purposes that include the purpose, of furthering the interests of its members in 
relation to their employment) engage in conduct in concert with one another. 
whether or not the conduct is also engaged in In concert with other pcnons, the 
organization shall be deemed for the purposes of chis Act 10 engage in that conduct 
in concert with the participants, and so 10 engage in that conduct for the purpose or 
purposes for which that conduct is engaged in by che participants, unless Che 
organization establishes that it took all reasonable steps 10 prevent the participants 
from engaging in that conduct. 
4SD(6) (Pcnaltlu for conduct contravening or deemed by subs«. (5) Co concravenc 
sub~c. (1) or (IA)) Where an organization of employees engages, or is deemed by 
sub-section (S) to engage, in conduct in concert with members or officers of the 
organization in contravention of sub-section (I) or (I A)-
(a) any loss or damage suffe";d by a person as a result or the conduct shall be 
deemed to have been caused by the conduct or the organization; 
(b) if the organization is a body corporate, no action under section 82 to recover 
the amount or the loss or damage may be brought against any or the members or 
officers of the organization; and 
(c) if the organization is not a body corporatc-
(i) a proceeding in respect of the conduct may be instituted under 5CC!ion 77, 
80 or 82 against an officer or officers or the organization as a representative 
or representatives of the members or the organization and a prooccding so 
instituted shall be deemed to be a proceeding against all the persons who were 
members of the organization at the time when the conduct was engaged in; 
(ii) sub-section 76(2) docs not prevent an order being made in a proceeding 
mentioned in sub-paracraph (i) that was instituted under section n; 
(iii) the_ maxi_mum pecuniary penalty that may be imposed in a prooecding 
mentioned 1n sub-paragraph (ii) is the penalty appliuble under section 76 in 
relation to a body corporate; 
(iv) except as provided by sub-paragraph (i), a proceeding in respect of the 
conduct shall not be instituted under section 77 or 82 against any or the 
members or officers of the organiz.ation; and 
(v) for the purpose of enforcing any judgment or order given or made in a 
proceeding mentioned in sub-paragraph (i) that is instituted under section n 
or 82, process may be issued and executed against any property o( the 
organization or of any branch or part of the organization, or any property in 
which the organization or any branch or part of the organization has, or any 
members of the organization or or a branch or part of the organization have 
in their capacity as such members, a beneficial interest, whether vested in 
trustees or however otherwise held, as if the organization were a b~ 
corporate and the absolute owner of the property or interest but no process 
shall be issued or executed against any other property of memben, or against 
any property or officers, or the organization or of a branch or part or the 
organization. 
4!50(7) (Section not to .rrttt other provisions or Pt. IV) Nothing in this section 
affects the operation of any other provision of this Part. 
SECTION 45E PROHIBITION OF CONTRACTS, ARRANGEME~TS OR 
UNDERSTANDINGS AFFECTING SUPPLY OR ACQUISITION OF GOODS 
OR SERVICES 
4SE(l) (Prohibited conduct] Subject to this section, a person who has been 
accustomed, or is under an obligation, to supply goods or services to, or to acquire 
goods or services from, a second person shall not make a contract or arrangement, 
or arrive at an understanding, with a third person (being an organization of 
employees, an officer of such an organization, or another person acting for or on 
behalf of such an organization or officer) if the proposed contract, arrangement or 
understanding contains a provision that-
(a) has the purpose of preventing or hindering the first-mentioned person 
from supplying or continuing to supply any such goods or services to the 
second person or, as the case may be, from acquiring or continuin& to 
acquire any such goods or services from the second person; 
{b) has the purpose of preventing or hindering the first-mentioned person 
from supplying or continuing 10 supply any such goods or services 10 the 
second person except subject 10 a condition (not being a condition to 
which the supply of such goods or services by the first-mentioned person 
to the second person has previously been subject by reason of a provision 
of a contract existing between those persons) as to the persons to whom, as 
to the manner in which, or as to the terms on which, the second puson 
may supply any goods or services; or 
(c) has the purpose · of preventing or hindering the first-mentioned person 
from acquiring or continuing to acquire any such goods or services from 
the second person except subject to a condition (not being a condition to 
which the acquisition of such goods or services by the first-mentioned 
person from the second person has previously been subject by reason or a 
contract existing between those persons) as to the persons to whom, as to 
the manner in which, or as to the terms on which, the second person may 
supply any goods or services. 
.cSE(l) (Consent or "target") Sub-section (I) docs not apply in relation to a 
contract, arrangement or understandin& that is in writing if the second person 
mentioned in that sub-section is a party to the contract, arrangement or 
understanding or has consented in writing to the contract or arrangement being 
made or the understanding being arrived at. 
.cSE(J) (Corpontlon to be lovolvcd) In a case where the person first mentioned 
in sub-section (I) is not a corporation, that sub-section applies only if the second 
person mentioned in that sub-section is a corporation. 
.cSE(4) (Application of para. 4F(a)J Paragraph 4F(a) 'applies in relation 10 sub-
section (I) of this section as if sub-paragraph 4F(a)(ii) were omitted .. 
.CSE(S) (Deemed ,uppller) Subject to sub-section (6), a reference in this section to 
a person who has been accustomed to supply goods or services to a second person 
shall be construed as including a reference to-
• 
(a) a re&ular supplier of any such &oods or services to the second person; 
lb) the latest supplier of any such goods or services to the second person; and 
(c) a person who at any time during the immediately preceding period of 3 
months supplied any such &oods or services to the second person • 
.CSE(6) (Certain pcnons deemed not to be accustomed auppllen) Where-
(a) &oods or s.crviccs have been supplied by a person to a second person 
pursuant to a contracc between choac persona under which the flnt• 
mentioned person was required over a particular period to supply such 
&oods or services; 
(b) that period has expired; and 
(c) after the expiration or that period the second person has been supplied 
with such goods or services by another person or other persons and has not 
been supplied with such goods or services by the first-mentioned person, 
then, for the purposes of the application of this section in relation to anything done 
after the second person has been supplied with goods or services as mentioned in 
parairaph (c), the first-mentioned person shall be deemed not to be a person who 
has been accustomed to supply such goods or services to the second person. 
4SE(7) (Deemed rdertncc to certain persons as acqulren) Subject to sub-section 
(8), a reference in this section to a person who has been accustomed to acquire goods 
or services from a second person shall be construed as Including a reference to-
(a) a regular acquirer of any such &oods or services from the i«ond person; 
(b) a person who, when he last acquired such goods or services, acquired them 
from the second person; and 
{c) a person wh~ at any time during the immediately preceding period or 3 
months acquired any such goods or services from the second person. . 
4SE(8) (Certain ptrsons deemtd not to be accustomed acqulrtrsJ Where-
(a) goods or services have been acquired by a person from a second person 
pursuant to a contract between those persons under which the first-
mentioned person was required over a particular period to acquire such 
goods or services; 
{b) that period has expired; and 
(c) after the expiration of that period the second person has refused to supply 
such goods or services to the first-mentioned person, 
then, for the purposes or the application of this section in relation to anything done 
after the second person has refused to supply goods or services as mentioned in 
paragraph (c), the first-mentioned person shall be deemed not to be a person who 
has been accustomed to acquire such goods or services from the second person . 
4SE(9) (Prohibition on prior agrttmenls, etc.) If-
(a) a person has, whether before or after the commencement of this section, 
made a contract or arrangement, or arrived at an understanding, with 
another person; and 
(b) by reason of a provision included in the contract, arrangement or 
understanding, the making of the contract or arrangement, or the arriving 
at the understanding, by the first-mentioned person contravened sub-
section (I) or would have contravened that sub-section if this section had 
been in force at the time when the contract or arrangement was made or 
the understanding was arrived at, ' 
a person s~all not give effect to that provision of the contract, arrangement or 
understanding. 
45E(10) (Determination of earlier contravention) Jn determinins for the 
purposes of paragraph (9)(b) whether a contract or arrangement made or 
understanding arrived at, before the commencement or th!s sectJon would have 
contravened sub-section (I) If this section had been in force at the time when the 
contract or arrange_ment was made, or the understanding was arrived at, sub-section 
(2) ~hall be read as if the words "that is in writing" and the words "in writin&" were 
omitted. 
4SE(l 1) (Preservation of other provisions) Nothing in this section affects the 
operation or any other provision of this Part. 
SECTION 46 MISUSE OF MARKET POWER 
46(1) .[Corporations taking adv~ntage or substantial degrtt or market power ror 
prohibited purposes] A corporation that has a substantial degree of power in a mark t 
shall not take advantage of that power for the purpose of- c 
(a) eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor of the corporat' r 
body COfJ)Orate !hat is related to the corporation in that or any othe ion olcr o a 
. r mar et; 
(b) preventing the entry of a person into that or any other market; or 
(c) deterring or preventing a person from engaging in competitive conduct in that 
or any other market. 
46(l) [Related bodies corporau - dttmlng provision) lf-
(a) a body corporate that is related to a corporation has, or 2 or more bodies 
corporate each of which is related to the one corporation together have, a 
substantial degree of power in a ma.rlcet; or 
(b) a corporation and a body corporate that is, or a corporation and 2 or more 
bodies corporate each of which is, related to that corporation, together have a 
substantial degree of power in a market, 
l1lC corporation shall be taken for the purposes of this section to have a substantial degree 
of power in that market. 
"6(3) [Relevant fadon ln determining dcgrtt of power ln a market] In determining 
fot the purposes of this section the degree of power that a body corporate or bodies 
corporate has or have in a marlcet, the Cowt shall have regard to the extent to which the 
conduct of the body corporate or of any of those bodies corporate in that marlcct is 
constrained by the conduct of-
(a) competiton, or potential competitors, of the body corporate or of any of those 
bodies corporate in that marlcet; or 
(b) persons to whom or from whom the body corpontc or any of those bodies 
corporate supplies or acquires goods or services in that market. 
"6(4) [Rdevaot mcrtoceS In sect.loo] In this sectioo-
(a) a reference to power is a reference to market power, 
(b) a reference to a market is a reference to a market for goods or services; and 
(c) a reference to power in relation to, or to conduct in, a market is a reference to 
power, or to conduct, in that marlcet either as a supplier or as an acquirer of 
goods or services in that market. 
46(5) (Mere acquisition or plant or equipment not surncltntl Without extending 
by implication the meaning of sub-section (I), a corporation shall not be taken to 
contravene that sub-section by reason only that it acquires plant or equipment. 
46(6) IEumptlons) This section docs not prevent a corporation from engaging in 
conduct that docs not constitute a contravention of any or the following sections, 
namely, sections 45,458, 47 and 50, by reason that an authorization is in force or by 
reason or the operation of section 93. 
"6(7) [Relevant purpose to be Inferred from relevant circumstances] Without in 
any way limiting the manner in which the purpose of a pcnon may be established for the 
purposes of any o<her provision of this Act, a corporation may be taken to have taken 
advantage of its power for a purpose referred to io sub-sectioo (I) oo<withst&.oding that, 
after all the evidence has been considered, the existence of that purpose is asccrta.inable 
only by inference from the conduct of the corporation or of aoy other person or from 
other relevant cin:umstancca. · 
SECTION 46A MISUSE OF MARKET POWER - CORPORATION WITH 
SUBSTANTIAL DEGREE OF POWER IN TRANS-TASMAN MARKET 
46A(l) {Definitions] In this s«tlon: 
"conduct", in relation to a market, means conduct in the market either as a 
supplier or acquirer of goods or services in the market; 
"Impact market" means a market in Australia that is not a market exclusively for 
services; 
"market power", in relation to a market, means market power in the market 
either as a supplier or acquirer of goods or services in the market; 
"trans-Tasman market" means a market in Australia, New Zealand or Australia 
and New Zealand for goods or services. 
46A(2) [Substantial degrtt trans-Tasman market power] A corporation that has a 
substantial degree of market power in a trans-Tasman market must not take advantage of 
that power for the purpose of: 
(a) eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor of the corporation, or of a body 
corporate that is related to the corporation, in an impact market; or 
(b) preventing the entry of a person into an impact market; or 
(c) deterring or preventing a person from engaging in competitive conduct in an 
impact market. 
46A(J) [Related bodies corporate - deeming provision] If: 
(a) a body corporate that is related to a corporation has, or 2 or more bodies corporate 
each of which is related to the one corporation together have, a substantial degree 
of market power in a trans-Tasman market; or 
(b) a corporation and a body corporate that is, or a corporation and 2 or more bodies 
corporate each of which is, related to the corporation, together have a substantial 
degree of market power in a trans-Tasman market; 
the corporation is taken, for the purposes of this section, to have a substantial degree of 
market power in the trans-Tasman market. 
46A(4) [Relevant factors In determining degree of market power] In determining 
for the purposes of this_~ti_on the degree of market power that a body corporate or 
t,odies corporate has or have in a trans-Tasman mancet, Ule t'COerat \..oun •• ,v ....... 
regard to the extent to whict> the conduct of the body corporate or of any of those bodies 
corporate, in the trans-Tasman market is constrained by the conduct of: 
(a) competitors, or potential competitors, of the body corporate, or of any of those 
bodies corporate, in the trans-Tasman market; or 
(b) persons to whom or from whom the body corporate, or any of those bodies 
corporate, supplies or acquires goods or services in the trans-Tasman market. 
46A(5) [Mere acquisition or plant or equipment not sufficient) Without extending 
by implication the meaning of subsection (2), a corporation is not taken to contravene 
that subsection merely because it acquires plant or equipment. 
46A(6) [Exemptions] This section docs not prevent a corporation from engaging in 
conduct that docs not constitute a contravention of any of the following sections, 
namely, sections 45, 45B, 47 and 50, because an authorisation is in force or because of 
the operation of section 93. 
46A(7) [Relevant purpose to be Inferred from relevant circumstances] Without 
limiting the manner in which the purpose of a person may be established for the purposes 
of any other provision of this Act, a corporation may be taken to have taken advantage of 
its market power for a purpose referred to in subsection (2) even though, after all the 
evidence has been considered, the existence of that purpose is ascertainable only by 
inference from the conduct of the corporation or of any other person or from other 
relevant circumstances. 
46A(8) (Appllcatfon to New Zuland and New Zea.land Crown rorporatlons) It is 
the intention of the Parliament that this section, and the provisions of Parts VI and XII so 
far as they relate to • contravention of this section, should apply to New Zealand and 
New ~and Crown corporations to the same extent, and in the same way, as they 
respectively apply under section 2A to the Commonwealth and authorities of the 
Commonwealth. 
46A(9) [Application or a«. 46A(8)) Subsection (8) has effect despite section 9 of the 
For~itn Staus /mmuniti~s Act 1985. 
SECTION 46B NO IMMUNITY FROM JURISDICTION IN RELATION TO 
CERTAIN NEW ZEALAND LAWS 
::~. er; ~~~:r~=n!ri=n~:~::~::]thel~s ~by_ 
Capital Teni!ory. and th_e Northern Tenitory, and their authorities arc ~ imrn:~ ~ ~= .ct&1m 1?1fflUnity, from ~ _jurisdiction of the courts ~f Australia and 'New 
an relation to matters ans1ng under sections 36A 98H d 99A r the 
Commerce Act I 986 of New Zealand. ' an ° 
46B(l) (Application] This section applies in and outside Australia. 
SECTION 47 EXCLUSIVE DEALING 
47(1) !Exclusive dealing prohibited) Subject to this section, a corporation shall 
not, in trade or commerce, engage in the practice of exclusive dealing. 
47(2) (Supply or ioods or services subject to a rcstrktlonJ A corporation engages 
in the practice of exclu!iive dealing if the corporation-
(a) supplies, or offers to supply, goods or services; 
(b) supplies, or offers to supply, goods or services at a particular price; or 
(c) gives or allows, or offers to give or allow, a discount, allowance, rebate or 
credit in relation to the supply or proposed supply of goods or services by the 
corporation, 
on the condition that the person to whom the corporation supplies, or offers or 
proposes to supply, the goods or services or, if that person is a body corporate, a body 
corporate related to that body corporate-
(d) will not, or will not except to a limited extent, acquire goods or services, or 
goods or services of a particular kind or description, directly or indirectly from 
a competitor of the corporation or from a competitor of a body corporate 
related to the corporation; 
(e) will not, or will not except to a limited extent, re-supply goods, or goods of a 
particular lcind or description, acquired directly or indirectly from a competitor 
of the corporation or from a competitor of a body corporate related to the 
corporation; or 
(f) in the case where the corporation supplies or would supply goods, will not re-
supply the goods to any person, or will not, or will not except to a limited extent, 
re-supply the goods-
(i) to particular persons or classes of persons or to persons other than 
particular persons or classes of persons; or 
(ii) in particular places or classes of places or in places other than particular 
places or classes of places. 
47(3) (Supplier's rdusal to deal) A corporation also engages in the practice of 
exclusive dealing if the corporation refuses-
(a) to supply goods or services to a person; 
(b) to s_upply goods or services to a person at a particular price; or 
(c) to give or allow a discount, allowance, rebate or credit in relation to the supply 
or proposed supply of goods or services to a person, . 
for the reason that the person or, if the person is a body corporate a body corporate 
related to that body corporate- ' 
(d) h~ acquired, or ~as not a_greed not to ~cquire, goods or services, or goods or 
services. of a particular lcmd or description, directly or indirectly from a 
competitor of t~e corporation or from a competitor of a body corporate related 
to the corporation; 
{c) ha~ rMupplicd, o·r ~s ~ot agreed not to re-supply, goods, or goods of a 
particular lc1nd or descnphon, acquired directly or indirectly from a competitor 
of the corporation or from a competitor of a body corporate related to the 
corporation; or 
(f) in the case of a refusal in relation to the supply or proposed supply of goods, 
has re-supplied, or has not agreed not to re-supply, g~ods, or goods of a 
particular kind or description, acquired from the corporation to any person, or 
has re-supplied, or has not agreed not to re-supply, go~s. or goods of a 
particular kind or description, acquired from the corporat1on-
(i) to particular persons or classes of persons or to persons other than 
particular persons or classes of persons; or 
(ii) in particular places or classes of places or in places other than particular 
places or classes of places. 
47(4) [Acqulrlng goods or ~rvkes subject to a restriction] A corporation also 
engages in the practice of exclusive dealing if the corporation--
(a) acquires, or offers to acquire, goods or services; or 
(b) acquires, or offers to acquire, goods or services at a particular price, 
on the condition that the person from whom the corporation acquires or offers to 
acquire the goods or services or, if that person is a body corporate, a body corporate 
· related to that body corporate will not supply goods or services, or goods or services of 
a particular kind or description, to any person, or will not, or will not except to a 
limited extent, supply goods or services, or goods or services of a particular kind or 
description-
(c) to particular persons or classes of persons or to persons other than particular 
persons or classes of persons; or 
(d) in particular places or classes of places or in places other than particular places 
or classes of places. 
47(5) [Refusal to deal ror prohibited reason] A corporation also engages in the 
· practice of exclusive dealing if the corporation rcfuses--
(a) to acquire goods or services from a person; or 
(b) to acquire goods or services at a particular price from a person, 
for the reason that the person or, if the person is a body corporate, a body corporate 
related to that body corporate has supplied, or has not agreed not to supply, goods or 
services, or goods or services of a particular kind or description-
(c) to particular persons or classes of persons or to persons other than particular 
persons or classes of persons; or 
(d) in particular places or classes of places or in pla«s other than particular places or 
classes of places. 
47(6) !Supplying goods or scrvkes subject lo a t.hlrd line forcing obligation) A 
corporation also engages in the practice of exclusive dealing if the corporation-
(a) supplies, or offers to supply, goods or services; 
(b) supplies, or offers to supply. goods or services at a particular price; or 
(c) gives or allows, or offers to give or allow, a discount, allowance, rebate or 
credit in relation to the supply or proposed supply of goods or services by the 
corporation, 
on the condition that the person to whom the corporation supplies or offers or 
proposes to supply the goods or services or, if that person is a body corporate, a body 
corporate related to that body corporate will acquire goods or services of a pan icular 
kind or description directly or indirectly from another person. 
47(7) !Refusal to supply associated with forcing another person's goods or 
services) A corporation also engages in the practice of exclusive dealing if the 
corporation refuses-
(a) to supply goods or services to a person; 
(b) to supply goods or services at a particular price to a person: or 
(c) to give or allow a discount. allowance. rebate or credit in relation to the supply 
of goods or services to a person, . 
for the reaso_n that the person or, if the person is a body corporate. a body corporate 
related to that body corporate has not acquired, or has not agreed to acquire, goods or 
services of a particular kind or description directly or indirectly from another person. 
47(8) I Restrictions or obligations In relation to leases and licences! A corporation 
also engages in the practice of exclusive dealing if the corporation grants or renews, 
or makes it known that it will not exercise a power or right to terminate, a lease of, 
or a licence in respect of, land or a building or part of a building on the condition 
that another party to the lease or licence or, if that other party is a body corporate, a 
body corporate related to that body corporate-
(a) will not, or will not except to a limited extent--
(i) acquire goods or services. or goods or services of a particular kind or 
description, directly or indirectly from a competitor of the corporation or 
.. from a competitor of a body corporate related to the corporation; or 
(11) _re-supply ~o~s. or goods of a particular kind or description, acquired 
directly or indirectly from a competitor of the corporation or from a 
competitor of a body corporate related to the corporation: 
(b) will not supply goods or services, or goods or services ofa particular kind or 
description, to any person. or will not, or will not except to a limited extent. 
supply goods or services. or goods or services of a particular kind or 
description-
(i) to particular persons or classes of persons or to persons other than 
panicular persons or classes of persons; or 
(ii) in particular places or classes of places or in J1laces other than particular 
places or classes of places: or 
(c) will acquire goods or services o( a particular kind or description directly or 
indirectly from another person not being a body corporate related to the 
corporation. 
47(9) (Rdusal to deal In relation to !uses and licences) A corporation also 
engages in the practice of exclusive dealing if the corporation ref~ses to. grant or 
renew, or exercises a power or right to terminate, a lease of, or a licence m respect 
of, land or a building or part of a building for the reason that another party to the 
lease or licence or, if that other party is a body corporate, a body corporate related 
to that body corporate-
(•) has acquired, or has not a~ccd not to ~cq_ui re, g.oods or sei:vi~s, or goods or 
services of a particular lond or description, directly or md1rcctly from a 
competitor of the corporation or from a competitor of a body corporate related 
to the corporation; 
(b) has re-supplied, or has not agreed not to re~supply, goods, or goods of a 
particular kind or description, acquired directly or indirectly from a competitor 
of the corporation or from a competitor of a body corporate related to the 
corporation; 
(c) has supplied goods or services, or goods or services of a particular kind or 
description-
(i) to particular persons or classes of persons· or to persons· other than. 
particular persons or classes of persons; or 
(ii) in partic.ular places or classes of places or in places other than particular 
places or classes of places; or · 
(d) has not acquired, or has not agreed to acquire, goods or services of a 
particular kind or description directly or indirectly from another person not 
being a body corporate related to the corporation. 
'47(10) (Substantially lcSKnln& competition) Sub-section (I) docs not apply to the 
practice of el(clusive dealing constituted by a corporation engaging in conduct of a 
kind referred to in sub-section (2), (3), (4) or (.5) or paragraph (8)(a) or (b) or (9)(a), 
(b) or (c) unlcss-
(a) the engaging by the corporation in that conduct has the purpose, or has or is 
likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition; or 
(b) the engaging by the corporation in that conduct, and the engaging by the 
corporation, or by a body corporate related to the corporation, in other 
conduct of the same or a similar kind, together have or arc likely to have the 
effect of substantially lessening competition. 
47(11) (Subs«Clon1 (I). (9) not to apply) Sub-sections (8) and (9) do not apply 
wlch respect to- · 
(a) conduct engaged in by, or by a trustee for, a religious, charitable or public 
benevolent institution, being conduct engaged in for or in accordance with the 
purposes or objects of that institution; or 
(b) condUd engaged in in pursuanoe ofa legally enforceable requirement made 
by, .or by a trustee for, a religious, charitable or public benevolent institution, 
being a requirement made for or in accordance with the purposes or objects of 
that institution. 
47( 12) (Subseclion ( I) no1 10 apply! Sub-section (l) does not apply with respect 
10 any conduct engaged in by a body corporate by way of restricting dealings by 
another body corporate if those bodies corporate are related to each other. 
47(13) (Refnencc to "condition", "competition"! In this scction-
(a) a reference to a condition shall be read as a reference 10 any condition, 
whether direct or indirect and whether having legal or equitable force or not, 
and includes a reference to a condition the existence or nature of which is 
ascertainable only by inference from the conduct of i,crsons or from other 
relevant circumstances; 
(b) a reference to competition, in relation 10 conduct to which a provision of this 
section other than sub-section (8) or (9) applies, shall be read as a reference to 
competition in any market in which-
(i) the corporation engaging in the conduct or any body corporate related to 
that corporation; or 
(ii) any person whose business dealings arc restricted. limited or olherwisc 
circumscribed by the conduct or, if that person is a body corporate, any body 
corporate related to 1hat body corporate. 
supplies or acquires, or is likely to supply or acquire. goods or services or would. 
but for the conduct, supply or acquire, or be likely 10 supply or acquire. goods 
or services; and 
(c) a reference to competition. in relation to conduct to which sub-section (8) or 
(9) applies, shall be read as a reCerence to competition in .iny market in which 
the corporation engaging in the conduct or any other corporation the business 
dealings of which arc restricted. limited or otherwise circumscribed by the 
conduct, or any body corporate related to either of those corporations. supplies 
or acquires, or is likely to supply or acquire. goods or services or would. but for 
the conduct, supply or acquire, or be likely to supply or acquire, goods or 
services. 
SECTION 48 RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE 
48 A corporation or other person shall not engage in the practice of resale price 
maintenance. 
SECTION 49 PRICE DISCRIMINATION 
49(1) (Prohibited conduct! A corporation shall not, in trade or commerce. 
discriminate between purchasers of goods of like grade and quality in relation to-
(a) the prices charged for the goods; 
(b) any discounts, allowances, re bales or credits given or allowed in rela1ion to the 
supply of the goods; 
(c) the provision of services in respect of the goods; or 
(d) the making of payments for services provided in respect of the goods, 
if the discrimination is of such magnitude or is of such a recurring or s~tematic 
character that it has or is likely to have the effect of substantially les~ningcompctition 
in a market for goods, being a market in which the corporation supplies, or those 
ocrsons supply, goods. 
49(2) ICertaln price discrimination not prohibiltdJ Sub-section (I) does not 
apply in relation lo a discrimination if-
(a) the discrimination makes only reasonable allowance for differences in !he cos! 
or likely cost of manufacture, distribution, sale or delivery resulting from the 
differing places lo which, method, by which or quantities in"' hich !he goods arc 
supplied lo the purcha~rs: or 
(b) the discrimination is constituted by !he doing o( an act in good faith lo mee1 a 
price or benefit offcrt'd by a compc1i1or of the supplier. 
49(.3) !Onus of eslablishing subsec. (I) does not apply) In any proceeding for a 
con1raven1ion of sub-section (1), lhc onus of establishing 1ha11ha1 sub-section docs 
001 apply in relation 10 a discrimination by reason of sub-section (2) is on lhe party 
asserting that sub-section (I) docs not so apply. 
49(4) (Allempls lo Induce or lo enter transaction lo obtain benefit of prohibited 
conduct prohibited) A person shall not, in trade or commercc-
(a) knowingly induce or altempt lo induce a corporation to discriminate in a 
manner prohibited by sub-section (I); or 
(b) enter into any transaction that to his knowledge would result in his receiving 
the benefit of a discrimination that is prohibited by that sub-section. · 
49(5) (Defence lo prosecution under substt, (4)) In .any proceeding against a 
person for a contravention of sub-section (4), ii is a defence if that person establishes · 
that he reasonably believed that, by reason of sub-section (2), the discrimination 
concerned was not prohibited by sub-section (I). 
APPENDIX4 
SECTION 50 MERGERS AND OTIIER ACQUISmONS 
50(1) [Prohibited mergers] A corporation shall not acquire, directly or indirectly, 
any shares in the capital, or any assets, of a body corporate if-
(a) as a result of the acquisition, the corporation would be, or be likely to be, in 
a position to dominate a market for goods or services; or 
(b) in a case where the corporation is in a position to dominate a market for goods 
or serviccs--
(i) ~ body corporate or another body corporate that~ related to, or associated 
with, ~t body corporate is, or is likely to be, a competitor of the 
corpora~on or of a body corporate that is related to, or associated with, the 
corporation; and 
(ii) the acquisition would, or would be likely to, substantially strengthen the 
power of the corporation to dominate that market. 
50(1~) ~dated or associated corporations) A body corporate that is related to, or 
~1atcd with, a corporation must noc acquire, directly or indirectly, any shares in the 
capital, or any assets, of any other body corporate (in this subsection called "an 
acquired body corporate") if: 
(a) as a result of the acquisition, the corporation would be, or be likely to be, in a 
position to dominate a market for goods or services; or 
(b) where the corporation is in a position to dominate a market for goods or services: 
(i) the acquired body corporate, or another body corporate related. to, or 
associated with, it, is, or is likely to be, a competitor of the corporation or of 
any body corporate related to, or associated with, the corporation; and 
(ii) the acquisition would, or would be likely to, substantially strengthen the 
power of the corporation to dominate that market. 
S0(1A) . [Acquisitions other than those by a corporation] A person other than a 
corporation shall ~ ~uirc, directly or indirectly, any shares 'in the capital, or any 
assets, of a corporation if-
(a) as ~ _result of ~ acquisition, the corporation would be, or be liltely to be, in a 
pos1llon to dominate a market for goods or services; or 
(b) in •. case where the person is in a position to dominate a marltet for goods or 
servJCCS--
(i) the corporation or a body C<XpOrate that is related to, or associated with the 
corporation is, or is lilcely to be, a competitor of the person; and ' 
(ii) the acquisition would, or would be likely to, substantially strengthen the 
power of the person to dominate that marlcet. 
50(2) [Corporation aeemed to be In position to dominate market) lf-
(a) a body corporate that is related to, or associated with, a corporation is, or two or 
more bodies corporate each of which is related to, or associated with, the one 
corporation together arc, in a position, or likely to be in a position, to dominate a 
market for goods or services; or 
(b) a corporation, and a body corporate that is, or two or more bodies corporate each 
of which is, related to, or associated with, that corporation, together arc in a 
position, or likely to be in a position, to dominate a market for goods or services, 
the corporation shall be deemed for the purposes of this section to be in a position to 
dominate that market, or to be likely to be in a position to dominate that market, as the 
case may be. 
S0(2AA) [Not restricted to acts ln concert) In subsection (2), the reference to bodies 
corporate, or a corporation and a body or bodies corporate, together being in a position 
to dominate a market is a reference to their being in that position whether or not they 
would_ need to act in concert to achieve such domination and whether or not they hav 
acted 10 concert to put themselves in that position. e 
50(2A) [Means of ldentu)'ing assoctatea bodies corporate) For the purposes of this 
section, a body corporate shall be taken to be associated with another body corporate 
(not being another body corporate that is related to the first-mentioned body corporate) if 
one of those bodies corporate (in this sub-section referred to as the "dominant body 
corporate") is, either alone or together with another body corporate that is, or other 
bodies corporate each of which is, related to the dominant body corporate, or associated 
with the dominant body corporate by another application or other applications of this 
sub-section, in a position to exert, or to be likely to be able to exert, whether directly or 
indirectly, a substantial degree of influence over the · activities of the other body 
corporate. 
SOC~AB) [Not restricted to acts In concert] In subsection (2A), the reference to 
~ics ~~rporate, together with_ another bod~ corporate or other bodies corporate, being 
m •. J?OSltlon to e.xcrt a substantial degree of influence is a reference to their being in that 
position whether or not they would need to act in concert to exert such inftuenc:e and 
whether or not they have acted in concert to put themselves in that position. 
S0(2B) [Irrelnant considerations In det.ennln.lng whether corporation exerts 
lnfluence .o~er ano~er] For the purpo5e;5 of sub-section (2A), the fact that a body 
corporate IS in a position to exert, or to be lilcely to be able to exert, a substantial degree 
of influence over the activities of another body corporate by reason only that-
(•) those bodies corporate arc in competition in the same market; or 
(b) ooc of those bodies corporate supplies goods or services to the other, 
shall be disregarded. 
S0(2C) [Bare transfers or monopoly power] This section docs not apply to the 
acquisition by a person of any shares in the capital, or any assets, of a body corporate 
whcn>-
(a) before the acquisition, the body corporate was in a position to dominate a 
market for goods or services; and 
(b) as a result of the acquisition, the person is not, and is not likely to be, in a 
stronger position to dominate that market. 
50(3) [Interpretation) In this scction-
(.A) a reference to a market for goods or services shall be construed as a reference 
to a substantial market for goods or services in Australia in a State or in a 
Territory; and . 
(b) a reference to dominating a market for goods or services shall be construed as 
a reference to dominating such a market either as a supplier or as an acquirer 
of goods or services in that market. · 
50(4) LEffect or contract requirement as fo authorization] When>-
(a) a person has entered into a contract to acquire shares in the capital, or assets, 
of a body corporate; 
(b) the contract is subject to a condition that the provisions oT the contract relating 
to the acquisition will not come into force unless and until the person has been 
granted an authorization to acquire the shares or assets; and 
(c) the person applied for the grant of such an authorization before the expiration 
of 14 days after the contract was entered into, 
the acquisition of the shares or assets shall not be regarded for the purposes of this Act as 
laving tuen place in pursuance of the contract befon>-
(d) the application for the authorization is disposed of; or 
(e) the contract cca.ses to be subject to the condition, 
whichever first happens. 
50'{5) (When 1ppllc1tlon dttmed to be disposed of) For the purposes of sub-
section (4), an application for an authorization shall be taken to be disposed of-
(a) in a case to which paragraph (b) of this sub-section docs not apply - at the 
expiration of 14 days after the period in which an application may be made to 
the Tribunal for a review of the determination by the Commission of the 
application for the authorization; or 
(b) if an application is made to the Tnounal for a review of the dctcnnination by 
the Commission of the application for the authorization - at the expiration of 
14 days after the date of the making by the Tribunal of a determination on the 
review. 
SECTION 50A ACQUISI:X-IONS OUTSIDE AUSTRALIA 
SOA(l) [Declaration by Tribunal where controlling Interest In corporation acquired 
outside Australia] Where a pe™>n acquires, outside Australia, otherwise than by 
reason of the application of paragraph (8)(b), a controlling interest in any body corporate 
and, by reason, but not necessarily by reason only, of the application of paragraph .<8)(b) 
in relation to the controlling interest, obtains a controlling interest in a corporation or 
each of 2 or more corporations, the Tribunal may, on the application of the Minister, the 
Commission or any other person, if the Tribunal is satisfied that-
(a) as a result of the obtaining by the person of the last-mentioned controlling 
interest, the person would be, or be likely to be, in a position to dominate a 
substantial market for goods or services in Australia, in a State or in a 
Territory; 
(b) in a case where the pe™>n is in a position to dominate such a market-
(i) the body corporate or another body corporate that is related to that body 
corporate is, or is likely to be, a competitor of the person or of a body 
corporate that is related to the person; and 
(ii) the acquisition would, or would be likely to, substantially strengthen the 
power of the person to dominate that market; and 
(c) the obtaining by the pe™>n of the last-mentioned controlling interest would 
not, in all the circumstances, result, or be likely to result, in such a benefit to 
the public that the obtaining of that controlling interest should be disregarded 
for the purposes of this section, 
make a declaration accordingly. 
SOA(2) [Tribunal to give notice In writing] Where an application under sub-section 
(I) is made-
(a) the Tribunal shall give to-
(i) each corporation in relation to which the application relates; and 
(ii) the Minister and the Commission, 
a notice in writing stating that the application has been made; and 
(b) the persons referred to in paragraph (a) and, if the application was made by 
another person, that other person are entitled to appear, or be represented, at 
the proceedings following the application. 
SOA(3) [Tlme wlthln which application must be made) An application under 
sub-section ()) may be made at any time within 12 months after the date of the 
acquisition referred to in that sub-section in relation to which the application is made. 
SOA(4) [Revocation or declaration of Tribunal] The Tribunal may, on the 
application of the minister, the Commission or any other person, or of its own motion, 
revoke a declaration made under sub-section (I). 
SOA(S) [Trlbun.al reasons to l:>c ln writing] The Tribunal shall state in writing its 
reasons for malcing, refusing to make or revoking a declaration under sub-section (l). 
SOA(6) [Availabllity or extension period] After the end of 6 months after a 
declaration is made under sub-section (I) in relation to the obtaining of a controlling 
illtercst in a corporation or 2 or more corporations by a person or, if the person, before 
the end of that period of 6 months, makes an application to a presidential member for an 
extension of that period, after the end of such further period (not exceeding 6 months) as 
the presidential member allows, the corporation or each of the corporations, as the case 
may be, shall not, while the declaration remains in force, carry on business in the market 
to which the declaration relates. 
SOA(7) [Acquisitions excluded from section) Sub-section (I) does not apply in 
relation to an acquisition referred to in that sub-section if sub-section 50(1) or (IA) 
applies in relation to that acquisition. 
50A(8) [Persons deemed to hold a controlling Interest] For the purposes of this 
section--
(a) a person shall be taken to hold a controlling interest in a body corporate if the 
body corporate is, or, if the person were a body corporate, would be, a· 
subsidiary of the person (otherwise than by reason of the application of 
paragraph 4A(l)(b)); and 
(b) where a person holds a controlling interest (including a controlling interest 
held by virtue of another application or other applications of this paragraph) in 
a body corporate and that body corporate-
(i) controls the composition of the board of directors of another body 
corporate; 
(ii) is in a position to cast, or control the casting of, any votes that might be 
cast at a general meeting of another body corporate; or 
(iii) holds shares in the capital of another body corporate, 
the person shall be deemed (but not to the exclusion of any other person) to 
control the composition of that board, to be in a position to cast, or control the 
casting of, those votes or to hold those shares, as the case may be. 
SECTION 51 EXCEPTIONS 
Sl(I) IRe&ard not lo be had to acts or thln&s approved or aulhorizrd by other 
le&lslatlonJ In determin ing whether a contravention of a provision of this Part has 
been committed, regard shall not be had-
(a) to any act or thing that is, or is of a 'kind, specifically authorized or approved 
by, or by regulations under, an Act other than an Act relating to patents, trade 
marks, designs or copyrights; 
(b) in the case of acts or things done in a St.ate - except as provided by the 
regulations, to any act or thing that is, or is of a lcind, specifically authorized or 
approved by, or by regulations under, an Act passed by the Parliament of that 
State; or 
{c:) in the case of acts or things done in a Territory - to any act or thing that i1, or 
is of a lcind, specifically authorized or approved by, or by regulations under an 
Ordinance of that .Territory. ' 
S 1(2) [Regard nol to be had lo certnln conlractual pro,·islons) In determining 
whecher a contravention of a provision of this Part other than section 4SD, 4SE or 
48 has been committed, regard shall not be had-
(a) lo any act done in relation to, or co the making of a contract or arrangement or 
the entering into of an understanding, or to any provision of a contract, 
arrangement or understanding, to the extent that the contract, arrangement or 
understanding, or the provision, relates to, the remuneration, conditions of 
employment, hours of work or working conditions of employees; 
(b) to any provision of a contract of service or of a contract for the provision of 
services, being a provision under which a person, not being a body corporate, 
agrees to accept restrictions as to the work, whether as an employee or 
otherwise, in which he may engage during, or after the termination of, the 
contract; 
(c) to any provision of a contract, arrangement or understanding, being a 
provision obliging a person to comply with or apply standards of dimension, 
design, quality or performance prepared or approved by the Standards 
Association of Australia or by a prescribed association or body; 
(d) to any provision of a contract, arrangement or understanding between 
partners none of whom is a body corporate, being a provision in relation to the 
terms of the partnership or the conduct of the partnership business or in relation 
lo competition between the partnership and a party to the contract, 
arrangement or understanding while he is, or after he ceases to be, a partner, 
(e) in the case of a contract for the sale of a business or of shares in the capital of a 
body corporate carrying on a business - to any provision of the contract that is 
solely for the protection of the purchaser in respect of the goodwill of the 
business; or 
(g) to any prov1S1on of a contract, arrangement or understanding, being a 
provision that relates exclusively lo the export of goods from Australia or to the 
supply of services outside Australia, if full and accurate particulars of the 
pro~ision (not including particulars of prices for goods or services but including 
particulars of any method of fix ing, controlling or maintaining such prices) 
were furnished to the Commission before the expiration of 14 days after the 
dale on which the contract or arrangement was made or the understanding was 
arrived at, or before 8 September 1976, whichever was the later. 
51(2A) (Certain acts by ultimate users or consumers outside trade or commerce 
excepted) In determining whether a contravention of a provision of this Part other 
than section 48 has been committed, regard shall not be had to any acts done, 
otherwise than in the course of trade or commerce, in concert by ult imate users or 
consumers of goods or services against the suppliers of those goods or services. 
SI(3) [Inclusion or certJlln conditions not to be tJlkcn as a conlranntlon or some 
provisions) A con!raveniion of a provision of 1his Part other than section 46, 46A or 
48 shall not be taken to have been commined by reason of-
(a) the imposing of, or giving effect to, a condi1ion of-
(i) a licence granted by 1he proprietor, licensee or owner of a palen!, of a 
regislered design, of a copyright or of EL rights within the mean ing of the 
Circuit l.Ayouts Act 1989, or by a person who has applied for a paten! or for 
the registration of a design; or · 
(ii) an assignment of a paten!, of a regi stered design, of a copyright or of such 
EL rights, or of the right to apply for a patent or for the registration of a 
design, 
to the extent that the condition relates to--
(iii) the invention to which the pa!enl or application for a patent relates or ar1icles 
made by the use of that invention; · 
(iv) goods in respect of which the de.sign is, or is proposed to be, registered and 
to which it is applied; 
(v) the work or other subject mailer in which the copyright subsists; or 
(vi) the eligible layout in which the EL rights subsist. 
(b) the inclusion in a Contract, arrangement OC Understanding authoriz.ing the US(! of a 
certification trade mark of a provision in accordance with rules applicable under 
Part XI of the Trade Marls Act 1955, or the giving effect to such a provision; or 
(c) the inclusion in a contract, arrangement or understanding between---
(i) the registered proprietor of a trade mark other than a certification trade mark; 
and 
(ii) a person regislered as a registered U5':r of that trade mark under Par1 lX of 
the Trade Marls Act 1955 or a person authorized by the contract to use the 
trade mark subject to his becoming registered lS such a registered user, 
of a provision to the extent that it relates to the kinds, qualities or standards of 
goods bearing the mark that may be produced or supplied, or the giving effect to 
the provision to that extent. · 
51(4) (Stctlon St to apply In drtermlnln& ~·hrther certain provisions or co,·tnants 
unenforct:ible) This section applies In determining whe1her a provision of a 
contract is unenforceable by reason of sub-seclion 45(1), or whether a covenant is 
unenforceable by reason of sub-section 45B(I), in like manner as it applies in 
de1ermining whether a contravention of a provision of this Part has been 
committed. 
51(5) [Application) In the applicalion of subs~lion (2A) lo sec1ion 46A,. t~e 
reference in that subsection to trade or commerce includes IIade or commerce within 
New Zealand. 
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